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THE DIAGNOSIS IS ANENCEPHALY AND
THE PARENTS ASK ABOUT ORGAN
DONATION: NOW WHAT? A GUIDE
FOR HOSPITAL COUNSEL AND
ETHICS COMMITTEES
JENNIFER S. BARD*

PROLOGUE: CASE STUDy-THE MSI

After a period of infertility treatments, Mr. and Mrs. M
learned that they were going to have triplets. Mrs. M, shortly there
after, developed a fear that something was wrong with one of the
babies whom she had named Avery. An ultrasound, at seventeen
weeks, confirmed Mrs. M's fear. Avery was missing her upper
skull. She had anencephaly.2 After telling the Ms the result of the
ultrasound, the maternal-fetal medicine doctor informed the Ms
* M.P.H, 1997, University of Connecticut; J.D., 1987, Yale Law School, B.A.,
1983, Wellesley College. Much of the research for this Article was done while a visiting
student at the Hastings Center. Thank you to Dr. Isabella Knox, Dr. David Gregorio,
Dr. Holger Hansen and Dr. Marilyn Sanders of the University of Connecticut Medical
School and Leigh Turner and Strachan Donnelley of the Hastings Center for their com
ments and encouragement on various drafts and sections of this Article. lowe a debt of
gratitude to the Ms, who shared their daughter with me. This Article is dedicated to Dr.
Barbara Bard and Eli Bard, my mother and brother, who have given me a lifetime of
support. It is completed in memory of Victor I. Seidman.
1. This is a report of a case occurring recently at a university medical center.
2. An infant with anencephaly is born without those portions of the brain that
create consciousness. See The Medical Task Force on Anencephaly, The Infant with
Anencephaly, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 669, 669 (1990) [hereinafter Task Force]. The
defect occurs early in the first month of fetal development when the neural tube, which
forms the brain, fails to close completely. See id. In common with many medical condi
tions, there is a range of physical findings that may be labeled anencephaly. This range
includes infants born without any brain and those infants born without significant por
tions of their brain. See id. Most infants born with this condition die soon after birth
since they lack even the autonomic brain stem function that keeps the heart beating.
See id. at 671. Pictures detailing the condition of anencephaly can be found in Pottor's
Atlas of Fetal and Infant Pathology. See ENID GILBERT-BARNES, POTTOR'S ATLAS OF
FETAL AND INFANT PATHOLOGY 246-47 (1998). For more information on anencephaly,
consult the world wide web; one interesting site is that of the Anencephaly Support
Foundation. See Anencephaly Support Foundation (visited Apr. 5, 1999) <http://
www.asfhelp.com>.
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about selective reduction. 3 He cautioned them, however, that re
ducing the anencephalic fetus could potentially create a risk of
aborting the two healthy fetuses. The Ms did not want to take this
risk. Instead, they tracked Baby Avery's growth throughout the
pregnancy.
Soon after learning that Baby Avery was likely to survive birth
but die shortly thereafter, the Ms thought of organ donation. Mrs.
M's mother was critically ill with lung disease and was on the wait
ing list for a lung transplant. Around the same time, Mr. M
remembered that Mickey Mantle was in the news for receiving a
liver transplant after only three days on the waiting list. He also
recalled David Crosby's receipt of a liver transplant. Mrs. M's
mother, however, did not get a transplant and died before the trip
lets were born. Mrs. M was too ill to attend the funeral. "We felt,"
said Mr. M, "that she couldn't get [the transplant] because of who
she was. A regular person had a harder time."
The Ms raised the issue of organ donation with their obstetri
cian. Shortly afterward, the obstetrician telephoned the local hospi
tal's transplant team to refer the Ms. One of the transplant
coordinators contacted the Ms and was initially positive about the
possibility of using Baby Avery's heart as a donor organ. The Ms'
understanding of their conversation with the transplant coordinator
was that the transplant coordinator "would send a [transplant] team
over" when the babies were born. "We felt good." Knowing that
Baby Avery could be an organ donor gave the Ms "a little peace of
mind." During the pregnancy, Mr. and Mrs. M met a mother whose
child was in need of a donor heart. While they knew Baby Avery's
heart would not go to that particular child, it made them feel better
to believe that a child who needed a heart would benefit from Baby
Avery's short life.
Around the same time, the maternal-fetal medicine service
first informed the neonatology service of the Ms' situation. It was
the first the neonatologists had heard of the imminent arrival of an
anencephalic triplet. The neonatologists also learned that the Ms
wanted Baby Avery to be an organ donor and that the Ms believed
that the transplant team was offering to harvest the organs as soon
as the babies were born.
3. This is a procedure in which a needle is inserted into the heart of a fetus, in this
case the anencephalic triplet, thus killing it. See Judith F. Darr, Selective Reduction of
Multiple Pregnancy: Lifeboat Ethics in the Womb, 25 V.C. DAVIS L. REv. 773, 779-80
(1992).
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The neonatologists, however, were surprised by this informa
tion. They discussed the issue of harvesting the organs shortly after
the babies' birth among themselves and then with the hospital's
legal counsel; the conclusion was that there was no legal precedent
for using an anencephalic infant as an organ donor. The neonatolo
gists also knew, due to a written policy statement, that the consult
ing neurologist's opinion was that an anencephalic infant was not
brain dead, and therefore, was not a candidate for organ donation.
At approximately the same time, the transplant team also began to
realize that there were serious barriers to harvesting organs from an
anencephalic infant. According to the Ms, based on the attitude of
the obstetricians and what they were hearing from the transplant
team, they began to realize that Baby Avery could not be an organ
donor. Mrs. M described the obstetrician as "passive" whenever
the idea was raised. The obstetrician, however, disagreed with this
perception; he felt that he supported the Ms' decision to donate
their baby's organs, but that the harvesting could not be done given
the current state of legal and medical practice. Mrs. M remembers
specifically, at some point before the birth, being told by the hospi
tal's transplant team that the team could not do the retrieval.
Nevertheless, the Ms remained hopeful that something might
be able to be arranged once the babies were born. At thirty-:.four
weeks, on November 10, 1995, Mrs. M went to the obstetrician for a
routine ultrasound. The obstetrician determined that one of the
two healthy triplets had stopped growing. It was time to deliver the
babies by caesarean section. Mrs. M's first reaction at hearing that
she was going to give birth to the triplets was relief. She was very
uncomfortable with "three sets of arms and legs" pushing against
her. Almost immediately though, she saddened. "I didn't want
them to take [the triplets] because it would mean that [Baby Avery]
would die."
The neonatologist met the Ms for the first time that afternoon
and was the first person to tell them definitively that Baby Avery
could not be an organ donor. The Ms were disappointed. One of
their first reactions was to ask whether Baby Avery could donate
organs for the other two triplets if necessary. After explaining that
the other two triplets would not need organ donations, the Ms were
again told that Baby Avery could not be an organ donor. Accord
ing to the neonatologist, the Ms had "been led to believe [organ
donation] was a possibility when it wasn't."
Baby Avery was delivered on November 10, 1995, at 7:35 p.m.
According to the neonatologist, the baby was breathing irregularly
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on her own at birth. After a few minutes of observation, her
breathing became regular. She was wrapped in a blanket and taken
to the nursery. She was kept warm, dry and fed. A hat was put on
her head. In accordance with her parents' wishes, no tubes, other
than feeding tubes and intravenous lines, were ever inserted into
the child. Baby Avery was connected to monitoring equipment.
The Ms and the neonatologist agreed that Baby Avery would not be
resuscitated when she began to die.
According to the Ms, Baby Avery was "perfect from the eye
brows down." As the ultrasound had revealed, she had no upper
portion of her skull and her brain stem was visible through the open
scalp. "They told us she would only live two hours," said Mrs. M,
but she lived two and one-half days. The Ms spent time, over the
two day period, holding and photographing Baby Avery. When
Baby Avery's heart rate began to slow, signifying that she was dy
ing, she was brought to the Ms, where she was held until she died.
"I don't know that she didn't feel anything," says Mrs. M. As she
was dying, "she would cry and her knuckles would tighten." "The
doctors told me that she didn't feel anything, but I don't believe
that-how do they know what she's feeling and what she's going
through." Baby Avery died at 7:35 a.m. on November 13, 1995.
Both Mr. and Mrs. M feel strongly that Baby Avery should
have been allowed to donate her organs. Reflecting on that time,
both Mr. and Mrs. M remarked on Baby Avery's strong and healthy
heart. "Her heart was very strong-a great heart. Her heart would
be a great transplant," said Mr. M. "I really wanted this done,"
remembered Mr. M, but "they backed off because of legal issues."
They said they "couldn't harvest organs from patients who are alive
... [and] couldn't pronounce [the baby] brain dead." Despite being
disappointed that Baby Avery could not be an organ donor, the Ms'
were very pleased with the care they and their babies received at
the hospital.
The issues surrounding organ donation by anencephalic infants
such as Baby Avery are complex for all involved. This Article will
examine anencephalic organ donation4 by providing an overview of
the legal, medical, social, and ethical issues that hospital counsel
4. For an excellent overview of the issues surrounding anencephalic organ dona
tion, see Calvin R. Stiller et aI., Organ and Tissue Transplants, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
BIOETHICS 1871, 1871-94 (Warren Thomas Reich ed., revised ed. 1995). For another
legal discussion of anencephalic organ donation, see Jay A. Friedman, Note, Taking the
Camel by the Nose: The Anencephalic as a Source for Pediatric Organ Transplants, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 917 (1990). Although Friedman's article was written prior to legal
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and ethics committees will face when presented with anencephalic
organ donation scenarios. This discussion will be framed by re
counting recent cases involving parents who wanted to donate their
anencephalic infant's organs. Furthermore, this Article will pro
pose that the topic of anencephalic organ donation be thoroughly
discussed and well understood in every medical/legal setting in
which an anencephalic infant may present itself. Preferably, this
should happen when there is no case pending so that policies can be
drafted without the time pressures of a pending case. It is essential
that transplant teams, organ procurement centers, lawyer-ethicists,
obstetricians, hospital counsel, maternal-fetal medicine specialists,
and neonatologists all share a common understanding of
anencephaly. Once an understanding is shared, parents of an
anencephalic infant will not be subjected to any greater pain and
confusion, due to miscommunication, than that which already sur
rounds the death of their child.
I.

A.

ANENCEPHALY

What Is Anencephaly?

A diagnosis of anencephaly in an infant, prenatally or at birth,
is a tragedy for all concerned. Anencephaly.is a birth defect in
which "(1) [a] large portion of the skull is absent[;] (2) [t]he scalp,
which extends to the margin of the bone is absent over the skull
defect[;] (3) [h]emorrhagic, fibrotic tissue is exposed because of de
fects in the skull and scalp[; or] (4) [r]ecognizable cerebral hemi
spheres are absent."5 Anencephalic infants lack the brain function
necessary for maintaining prolonged independent respiration and
are prone to severe infections from their open heads. 6 Further, in
fants with anencephaly are believed to be permanently uncon
scious. As one blunt commentator has noted, "[normal brain]
stems do not differ substantially from the brain stem of a fish, [and
an anencephalic infant] has more in common with a fish than a per
son."7 While there are anecdotal reports of survival by
anencephalic infants for a few days, weeks, or even years, most
decisions which have affected the law regarding anencephalic infants, it raises and ana
lyzes several issues that remain important today.
5. Task Force, supra note 2, at 670.
6. See id. at 669.
7. Sabra Chartrand, Legal Definition of Death Is Questioned in Florida Infant
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1992, § 1, at 12. While this quotation has made its way into
the popular lexicon of anencephalic organ donation, its source, Dr. Robert Levine, ex
plains that he did not intend to compare the baby with a fish. Rather, he was making an
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anencephalic infants die at, or soon after, birth.8
B.

Anencephaly in the Context of Organ Donation

For parents, a diagnosis of anencephaly foretells the ultimate
death of their child. For a medical staff, a diagnosis of anencephaly
means presiding over an infant's death rather than the beginning of
a new life. For hospital counsel, a diagnosis of anencephaly triggers
a number of legal and ethical issues that must be resolved quickly
and often under great stress. Parents will sometimes, in light of
publicity about the need for pediatric organ donors, bring up the
issue of organ donation soon after hearing the diagnosis. This re
quest will usually trigger an emergency meeting of the hospital's
ethics committee, which will then have to make a recommendation
in the face of little or no information. 9
In order to be considered for organ donation, an anencephalic
infant must be deemed brain dead.1O In the context of anencephaly,
unfortunately, the brain death standard is often misunderstood by
counsel advising the ethics committees, by the medical community,
in general, and by parents who are told on the one hand that their
baby lacks a brain, but on the other hand that their baby cannot be
an organ donor due to residual brain function. Counsel must there
fore have a solid understanding of the legal standards of death in
order to adequately advise clients in this area.
A human being must be legally brain dead before becoming an
observation on brain function. Interview with Robert Levine, M.D., Professor, Yale,
University, in New Haven, Conn. (Mar. 31, 1999).
8. See E. Haavi Morreim, Futilitarianism, Exoticare and Coerced Altruism: The
ADA Meets Its Limits, 25 SETON HALL L. REv. 883, 886 (1995) ("Quantitatively, [treat
ment] is futile because an anencephalic [infant] will die soon no matter what physicians
do.").
9. See generally Robert M. Nelson & Robyn S. Shapiro, The Role of an Ethics
Committee in Resolving Conflict in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit, 23 J. L. MED. &
ETHICS 27 (1995).
10. Most states use the Uniform Determination of Death Act ("UDDA") to de
termine whether a person is alive or dead. The UDDA provides the following:
An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory
and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the
entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A determination of death must
be made in accordance with accepted medical standards.
UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH Acr § 1, 12A U.L.A. 593 (1996).
In Washington, D.C., doctors are authorized to extract and preserve organs for
transplant even before receiving the family's consent. However, such consent must be
obtained before actual transplantation may occur. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 2.1509.1
(Supp. 1998); see also Rick Weiss, Demand for Organs Fosters Aggressive Collection
Methods, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 1997, at AI.
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organ donor, except where an organ, such as a kidney, can be
donated without ending the life of the donor. l1 Since an
anencephalic infant retains basic brain functions, it cannot meet this
current standard of brain death. 12 Therefore, in almost every case,
anencephalic organ donation cannot be accomplished. 13 The only
exception is for tissue donation, such as corneas and heart valves,
which can be harvested after clinical death.14 The solid organs are
buried with the infant, in essence adding to the shortage of pediatric
donors and placing tremendous pressure on both families of poten
tial organ recipients and the medical personnel treating those pa
tients. Is Despite the small percentage of the potential donor pool
that they comprise, anencephalic infants draw a fair amount of at
tention as potential organ donors.
The issue of anencephalic organ donation is hotly debated and
has generated significant comment from doctors, lawyers, and
ethicists. 16 A leading article in the Journal o/the American Medical
Association in 1989, authored in part by Alexander Capron and
Alan Shewmon, provided the seminal analysis of public health,
legal, medical, and ethical issues raised by anencephalic organ do
nationP The article predicted that anencephalic infants would
never be a significant source of donor organs due to ethical and
legal difficulties. 18 Ten years later, many of the article's predictions
about attempts to use anencephalic infants as organ donors have
proven accurate. Most notably, major advances in prenatal diagno
sis have dramatically reduced the number of potential anencephalic
organ donors, thereby strengthening the contention that the actual
number of such organs available is so small that anencephalic in
fants cannot provide a realistic answer to the critical shortage of
11. For a discussion of the determination of whether a person is alive or dead, see
supra note 10.
12. See Norman Fost, Removing Organs from Anencephalic Infants: Ethical and
Legal Considerations, 16 CLINICS IN PERlNATOLOGY 331, 333 (1989).
13. See Task Force, supra note 2, at 671.
14. See Rene Lafreniere & Mary H. McGrath, End of Life Issues; Anencephalic
Infants as Organ Donors, 1998 J. AM. C. SURGEONS 443, 445.
15. See generally Kathleen L. Paliokas, Anencephalic Newborns as Organ Do
nors: An Assessment of "Death" and Legislative Policy, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 197
(1989).

16. See, e.g., D. Alan Shewmon et aI., The Use of Anencephalic Infants as Organ
Sources, 261 JAMA 1773 (1989); George J. Annas, From Canada with Love:
Anencephalic Newborns as Organ Donors, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1987, at 36.
17. See Shewmon et aI., supra note 16.
18. See id. at 1780.
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infant donor organs. 19 Nonetheless, the issues raised by
anencephalic organ donation remain important in light of present
day attempts to increase the pool of potential organ donors by in
cluding those without a functioning consciousness, such as people in
permanent vegetative states.

II.

THE ORGAN DONATION SYSTEM

Organ donation in the United States is highly regulated by
state and federal laws. The federal government regulates organ do
nation through the National Organ Transplant Act ("NOTA").20 In
addition, every state has enacted the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
("UAGA"),21 which grants individuals and, after death, their family
members the right to decide whether or not to donate organs.22
Under both the federal and state laws, it is a crime for any person
to pay money for an organ. 23 Thus, a person in need of an organ
transplant must. rely on a volunteer donor rather than personal ac
quisition of an organ; unfortunately, the system of matching recipi
ents with volunteer donors is very complex. 24
19. The number of anencephalic babies born has dropped steadily since the
1960's. See id. at 1774. The sharp decline in the number of reported births of
anencephalic infants, along with the growing, almost universal practice of screening
every pregnancy with ultrasound, has made it interesting to revisit Capron and
Shewmon's analysis of how many organs would actually be available for donation by
anencephalic infants. See id. at 1774-75.
Assuming 4 million live births a year, rather than the 3.5 million used by Shewmon
and Capron in 1989, and 0.3 cases of anencephaly per 1000 births, there should be 1200
potential organ donors born in the United States every year. See id. at 1774. Approxi
mately 20% of pregnancies are screened for neural tube defects during the second tri
mester, see id., resulting in 240 cases detected. Approximately 95% of these
pregnancies are likely to be terminated, see id., making the number of anencephalic
births around 970 per year. Shewmon and Capron estimate that 66% of anencephalic
infants are still born, see id., reducing the total live births to 330. Of these, Shewmon
and Capron estimate that 60% are too small to serve as organ donors, leaving 132 in
fants. If, again as Shewmon and Capron estimate, two thirds of the parents are willing
to use their infants as donors, see id., there would be 87 donors. These 87 potential
donors are not sufficient to meet the need for pediatric organs.
This update of Shewmon and Capron's analysis only strengthens their point that
the available pool of anencephalic infants is too small to be a significant factor in in
creasing organ availability. See id. at 1774-75, 1780.
20. See 42 U.S.c. §§ 273-274e (1994).
21. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, 8A U.L.A. 19 (1993).
22. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 3, 8A U.L.A. 40 (1993).
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 274e; UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 15, 8A u.L.A. 62
(1993).
24. Organ transplantations are administered in hospitals by organ procurement
teams which operate under United Network for Organ Sharing ("UNOS") guidelines to
harvest organs and make them available to patients in need. The organ procurement
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Perhaps the greatest issue currently facing pediatric transplan
tation is that of organ supply. For some children, especially infants
with heart conditions, a transplant is their only chance for long term
survival. 25 In fact, the single most needed organs for children are
hearts and, to some extent, livers.26 Moreover, the scarcity of pedi
atric organs creates intense demand. Thus, the issue of pediatric
organ donation has become a major public health concern.27 Nu
merous plans and proposals to increase the availability of pediatric
organ donors have been brought forward, including proposals to
increase the supply of organs from humans,28 animals,29 and
anencephalic infants.3o
team may already be involved by the time the issue of organ donation reaches counsel,
as was the case with Baby Avery. Counsel should not rely on the organ procurement
team to manage the issue. The question of anencephalic organ donation may never
have occurred at the particular medical center. Even in centers with policies governing
anencephalic organ donation, the organ procurement team can, as was the case with
Baby Avery, unreasonably raise expectations by failing to adequately explain the issue
of brain death.
25. These infants are particularly good candidates for transplant since they are
usually healthy in every way except for their heart defect. Moreover, since infants are
much less likely to reject a heart than adults, transplantation is a "rational, durable
therapy" for hypoplastic left heart syndrome. Howard P. Gurgesell & Thomas A. Mas
saro, Management of Hypoplastic Left Heart Syndrome in a Consortium of University
Hospitals, 76 AM. J. CARDIOLOGY 809, 810 (1995); see also Leonard L. Bailey et ai.,
Bless the Babies: One Hundred Fifteen Late Survivors of Heart Transplantation During
the First Year of Life, 105 J. THORACIC & CARDIOVASCULAR SURGERY 805 (1993).
26. See Ingrid Kinkopf-Zajac, Assessing Patient Compliance in the Selection of
Organ Transplant Recipients, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 503, 521-23 (1996) (explaining that
livers and hearts are especially needed for transplants because patients in need of these
organs will die if denied an organ, unlike an organ such as a kidney for which there are
alternative methods to sustain life other than an organ transplant).
27. While there is no formal cost-benefit analysis of infant organ transplantation,
one leading commentator recently noted that "the cost of many other forms of medical
care is on a par with transplantation." Arthur L. Caplan, Current Ethical Issues in Or
gan Procurement and Transplantation, 272 JAMA 1708, 1708-09 (1994).
28. One of the most extreme proposals for increasing the availability of organs is
an "organ draft [which] would empower the state to conscript every cadaveric organ
suitable for transplantation without regard to any contrary wishes expressed by the de
cedent while he lived or by surviving relatives after he dies." Theodore Silver, The Case
for a Post-Mortem Organ Draft and a Proposed Model Organ Draft Act, 68 B.U. L.
REv. 681, 681 (1988). Another suggestion is to pay families to release their relative's
organs for donations. See Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and the Law,
103 HARV. L. REv. 1519, 1623-29 (1990).
29. See generally Charles R. McCarthy, Bioethics Inside the Beltway: A New Look
at Animal-to-Human Organ Transplantation, 6 KENNEDY INsT. ETHICS J. 183 (1996).
30. See, e.g., Beth Brandon, Note, Anencephalic Infants as Organ Donors: A
Question of Life or Death, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 781 (1989-90); Friedman, supra
note 4; Andrea K. Scott, Note, Death Unto Life: Anencephalic Infants as Organ Donors,
74 VA. L. REv. 1527 (1988).
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ORGAN DONATION BY ANENCEPHALIC INFANTS

A Court's Analysis: The Baby Theresa Case '

The issues surrounding the use of anencephalic infants as organ
donors was the topic of much debate, but very little legal guidance,
until the case of Theresa Ann Campo Pearson ("Baby Theresa")
arose in Florida. 31 In 1992, with the birth of Baby Theresa, the le
gality of anencephalic organ donation was tested for the first time
in United States' courts. 32 Baby Theresa was diagnosed prenatally
with anencephaly and her mother agreed to a caesarean section
"with the express hope that the infant's organs would be less dam
aged and could be used for transplant in other sick children. "33
Baby Theresa's birth sparked an intense debate in the legal commu
nity regarding the legal restrictions on organ donation. 34
A fundamental legal principle of organ donation requires the
donor, or his family, to consent to the donation. 35 While no specific
law requires that organ donation be undertaken voluntarily, the for
cible invasion of a person's bodily integrity to obtain an organ is a
crime just like any other assault. 36 When the prospective donor is a
minor, the process is even more highly regulated, with great care
taken to avoid exploitation. 37 The events of Baby Theresa's life are
well known. The child's parents were told in the eighth month of
pregnancy that their daughter was anencephalic and would either
be born dead or live for just a few minutes. 38 The doctors suggested
31. See In re T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1992). See generally J. Steven Justice,
Casenote, Personhood and Death-the Proper Treatment of Anencephalic Organ Do·
nors Under the Law: In Re T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1992), 62 U. CIN. L. REv. 1227
(1994).
32. See Joseph M. Healey, Ends and Means in Organ Transplantation: The
Anencephalic Donor, 57 CONN. MED. 49, 49-50 (1993).
33. T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d at 589.
34. See, e.g., Daniel Avila, Medical Treatment Rights of Older Persons and Persons
with Disabilities: 1992-93 Developments and Emerging Trends, 9 ISSUES L. & MED. 345
(1994); Lisa E. Hanger, The Legal, Ethical and Medical Objections to Procuring Organs
from Anencephalic Infants, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 347 (1995); Justice, supra note 31; David
T. McDowell, Note, Death of an Idea: The Anencephalic as an Organ Donor, 72 TEX. L.
REv. 893 (1994).
35. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFr ACT § 3, 8A U.L.A. 40 (1993).
36. See Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Mem'l Hosp., 638 A.2d 346 (N.J. 1988); see
also Kevin P. Quinn, Comment, The Best Interests of Incompetent Patients: The Capac
ity for Interpersonal Relationships as a Standard for Decisionmaking, 76 CAL. L. REv.
897 (1988) (describing the common law right to freedom from nonconsensual invasions
of bodily integrity and the federal constitutional right to privacy).
37. See ANGELA RODDEY HOLDER, LEGAL ISSUES IN PEDIATRICS AND ADOLES
CENT MEDICINE 167-72 (2d ed. 1985).
38. See T.A.c.P., 609 So. 2d at 589.
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a third-trimester abortion, but also explained that the baby would
be a candidate for organ donation if she were carried to term.39
Theresa's parents decided not to pursue an abortion but in
stead to, donate her organs. 40 For a short period after birth, the
baby was placed on a mechanical ventilator as a precautionary mea
sure. 41 However, Baby Theresa continued to breath after she was
removed from life support; thus, she became ineligible to be de
clared dead under an applicable Florida statute. 42 Faced with this
change in circumstances, the hospital refused to consider the child
as an organ donor "out of concern that [it] might incur civil or crim
inal liability."43 The hospital's action triggered a legal petition by
the parents which sought to declare Theresa dead so that her organs
could be donated. 44
The trial court held that, under Florida law, Baby Theresa was
ineligible to be declared dead since she was surviving without life
support and her brain stem continued to function. 45 Theresa's par
ents appealed; the Florida District Court of Appeal for the Fourth
District "summarily affirmed but then certified the trial court's or
der to [the Florida Supreme Court] for immediate resolution of the
issue."46 Although Baby Theresa died during the pendency of the
appeal,47 the Florida Supreme Court agreed to decide the case in
order to establish a legal precedent. 48 In In re T.A.C.P,49 the court
recognized Theresa's parents' intent in pursuing the action by stat
ing "[w]e have been deeply touched by the altruism and unques
tioned motives of the parents of [Baby Theresa]. The parents have
shown great humanity, compassion, and concern for others."5o The
court also recognized the pressing need for organ donors, writing
39. See id.; see also Frank A. Chervenak et aI., When Is Termination of Pregnancy
During the Third Trimester Morally Justifiable?, 310 NEW ENG. J. MED. 501, 501-03
(1984) (explaining the process of third trimester abortions).
40. See T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d at 589. The baby was delivered by cesarean section
on March 21, 1991, to reduce trauma to the organs. See id.
41. See id.
42. The court stated that "the evidence shows that [Baby Theresa's] heart was
beating and she was breathing at the times in question. Accordingly, she was not dead
under Florida law, and no donation of her organs would have been legal." Id. at 595.
43. Id. at 589.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. Id.
47. See id. at 589 n.2.
48. See id. at 589.
49. 609 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1992).
50. Id. at 594.
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"[t]here
is no doubt that a need exists for infant organs for
transplantation. Nationally, between thirty and fifty percent of chil
dren under two years of age who need transplants die while waiting
for organs to become available."51
The court then analyzed common law and statutory law and
found that, under common law, a person is viewed as being dead
when he can no longer breath and his blood stops circulating. 52
Considering rapid advances in medical technology, most states have
adopted the Uniform Determination of Death Act. 53 Florida, how
ever, as recognized by the court, enacted a statute that requires
"irreversible cessation of the functioning of the entire brain, includ
ing the brain stem" before a person may be viewed as dead. 54
The Florida Supreme Court, in T.A. c.P., concluded that the
Florida statute applied to persons on life support only.55 At the
time her parents brought the petition, Baby Theresa was breathing
on her own without the need for life support. Thus, the court con
cluded that "[t]he evidence shows that [Baby Theresa's] heart was
beating and she was breathing at the times in question. Accord
ingly, she was not dead under Florida law, and no donation of her
organs would have been legal."56 Importantly, the court decided
not to read an exception for anencephalic infants into the law, not
ing that "the 1988 Florida Legislature considered a bill that would
have defined 'death' to include anencephaly" but rejected it.57
51. Id. at 591 (citing Joyce L. Peabody et aI., Experience with Anencephalic In
fants as Prospective Organ Donors, 321 NEW ENG. J. MIlD. 344, 344 (1989».
52. See id. at 591-93.
53. UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEAlE Acr, 12A U.L.A. 589 (1996). The
T.A.C.P. court recognized the existence of the Uniform Act and quoted its language:
"An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and
respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain,
including the brain stem, is dead. A determination of death must be made in accord
ance with accepted medical standards." T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d at 592 (quoting UNIF.
DETERMINATION OF DEAlE Acr § 1, 12 U.L.A. 340 (Supp. 1991».
54. T.A.c.P., 609 So. 2d at 592. The entire statutory section reads as follows:
For legal and medical purposes, where respiratory and circulatory functions
are maintained by artificial means of support so as to preclude a determination
that these functions have ceased, the occurrence of death may be determined
where there is the irreversible cessation of the functioning of the entire brain,
including the brain stem, determined in accordance with this section.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 382.009(1) (West 1998). A later subsection explains further that
"[e]xcept for a diagnosis of brain death, the standard set forth in this section is not the
exclusive standard for determining death or for the withdrawal of life support systems."
Id. § 382.009(4).
55. See T.A. c.P., 609 So. 2d at 592.
56. Id. at 595.
57. /d. at 593. The court noted the following: "The bill died in committee. While
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The Rise of Organ Donation by Anencephalic Infants

Some critics of anencephalic organ donation might question
the technical feasibility of such transplants. As medical technology
has advanced, however, it has become increasingly possible to sup
port organs by keeping anencephalic infants oxygenated through
mechanical life support. 58 Furthermore, medical literature indi
cates that transplanting organs from anencephalic infants is possi
ble. 59 This technical feasibility, combined with the possibility of
preserving the anencephalic infant's visceral organ functions when
born, and the inevitability of the anencephalic infant's death, has
led physicians to view these infants as potential organ donors.6o
Viewing anencephalic infants as potential organ donors has brought
on great debate and angry protest from many organizations. 61
The issue of anencephalic organ donation reached widespread
public attention for the first time in 1968, when one of the first suc
cessful heart transplants was performed using an anencephalic in
fant as a donor. 62 After this success, programs for harvesting
organs from anencephalic infants became widespread, especially
outside of the United States. There were reports during the late
the failure of legislation in committees does not establish legislative intent, it neverthe
less supports the conclusion that as recently as 1988 no consensus existed among Flor
ida's lawmakers regarding the issue we confront today." Id.
58. Since the mother's "life support system" supports the fetus' growth in the
womb, anencephalic infants who survive to term frequently, but do not always, do so
with all of their internal organs intact and well formed. What goes wrong, in basic
terms, is that there is no brain or nervous system to take over at birth. In every case of
true anencephaly, the baby lacks the parts of the brain that regulate "consciousness,
thought, memory and feeling." Scott, supra note 30, at 1527 n.4.
59. See Task Force, supra note 2, at 672. There are some restrictions, however, on
the use of an anencephalic's organs for transplantation. First, anencephalic infants are
often premature and weigh less than 2,000 grams. See id. This can result in organs too
small to be of use. See id. Also, in some cases anencephaly is associated with other
birth defects which affect the organs. See id.
60. In fact, there have been reported cases of anencephalic organ transplantation
in the United States. George Annas reports that the first human to human transplant in
the United States was done in 1968 by Adrian Kantrowitz, and actually involved an
anencephalic infant as a donor. See Annas, supra note 16, at 37.
61. The following organizations filed amicus briefs opposing the use of Baby The
resa's organs in the T.A.c.P. case: Americans United for Life and Florida Right to
Life; the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Florida, Inc.; the Arc, Ethics
and Advocacy Task Force of the Nursing Home Action Group; the United Network for
Organ Sharing; and the Advocacy Center for Persons with Disabilities, Inc. See
T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d at 588. See Shewmon et aI., supra note 16, for a further discussion
of this opposition.
62. See supra note 60 for a brief discussion of this transplant.
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1980's of kidney transplants from West Germany63 and Spain. 64

C.

The Medical Community's Response to Using Anencephalic
Infants as Organ Donors

In December of 1994, the Council on Ethical and Iudicial Af
fairs ("CEIA") reversed their long standing position that an
anencephalic infant must be declared dead in order to be treated as
an organ donor. 65 CEIA is a subdivision of the American Medical
Association ("AMA"), which interprets the principles of medical
ethics for the AMA.66 Rather than require an anencephalic infant
to be declared dead before organ donation, as the AMA had done
in the past, CEIA's 1994 opinion provided that organs could be ob
tained from a still living anencephalic infant.67 CEIA supported
this position by reasoning that anencephalics have no consciousness
and therefore do not have the rights of human beings. 68 The AMA
adopted the opinion and it was, for a short time, the official position
of the AMA that organs could be harvested from a living
anencephalic infant. 69 A public and professional outcry followed
this announcement. 70 Physicians, parents of handicapped infants,
and clergymen were all opposed to the new position.71 Reacting to
the protest, the AMA took the unusual action of having a public
hearing on the issue.72 Based on the results of that hearing, CEIA
suspended its position, thus returning to the position that the AMA
had held since 1982: an anencephalic infant must be declared dead
in order to be treated as an organ donor. 73
The AMA's retreat reflected the feelings of a substantial
number of physicians who were not comfortable with . using
anencephalic neonates as organ donors. This decision was based on
63. See generally Wolfgang Holzgreve et aI., Kidney Transplantation from
Anencephalic Donors, 316 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1069 (1987).
64. See generally F.J. Gomez-Campdera et aI., Kidney Transplantation from
Anencephalic Donors, 10 CHILD NEPHROLOGY & UROLOGY 143 (1990).
65. See James Walters et aI., Anencephaly: Where Do We Now Stand?, 17 SEMI·
NARS IN NEUROLOGY 249, 250-57 (1997).
66. See id. at 249-50.
67. See id. at 250-51.
68. See id. at 251 (quoting Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, The Use of
Anencephalic Neonates as Organ Donors, 273 JAMA 1614, 1615 (1995) [hereinafter
CEJA]).
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id.
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"reports from the scientific community that question[ed] the as
sumption that all infants with anencephaly lack consciousness."74 It
is therefore arguable that the AMA implicitly retained the position
that an anencephalic infant that lacks consciousness can be consid
ered as an organ donor, even if the infant does not meet the legal
standards of death.75
IV.

SOCIAL CONSIDERATIONS IMPACrING ORGAN DONATION BY
ANENCEPHALIC INFANTS

There are a number of social concerns surrounding
anencephalic organ donation. Many groups, such as pediatricians,
parents of anencephalic infants, parents of children in need of or
gans, and political issue groups that oppose any taking of human
life, frequently express their opinions on this issue. In fact, the
AMA's decision to suspend its policy on anencephalic organ dona
tion was spurred by protest from the medical community.76 The
protest included activities by anti-abortion groups, such as the Na
tional Right to Life Committee ("NRLC"), which views
anencephalic infants as alive because they are born with a brain
stem.?7 Since, the NRLC is committed to preserving life in all of its
forms, including that of the fetus, it opposes using the anencephalic
infant as an organ donor.?8
.
Another group that opposes declaring anencephalic infants
dead for the purpose of organ donation is the Advocacy Center for'
Persons with Disabilities, Inc. ("ACPD"), which protects and advo
74. Diane M. Gianelli, Ethics Council Reverses Stand on Anencephalic Organ Do
nors, AM. MED. NEWS, Dec. 25, 1995, at 3.
75. See generally Walters et aI., supra note 65, at 250-57. With the withdrawal of
the December 1994 position, the AMA's position on anencephalic infants as organ do
nors is that:
Physicians may provide anencephalic infants with ventilator assistance and
other medical therapies that are necessary to sustain organ perfusion and via
bility until such time as a determination of death can be made in accordance
with accepted medical standards and relevant law. Retrieval and transplanta
tion of the organs of anencephalic infants are ethically permissible only after
such determination of death is made, and only in accordance with the Coun
cil's guidelines for the transplantation.
Charles W. Plows, The Use of Anencephalic Neonates as Organ Donors-Reconsidera
tion, in CoUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE
OF DELEGATES OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, 49TH INTERIM MEETING
225, 225 (1995).
76. See supra Part III.C for a discussion of the AMA's response to such protest.
77.. See Walters et aI., supra note 65, at 251; see also Scott, supra note 30, at 1555
58 (explaining the views of NRLC in general).
78. See Scott, supra note 30, at 1555.
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cates for persons with disabilities. The ACPD is concerned about
the fate of anencephalic infants because of its mission to advocate
for those members of society who must struggle daily against those
who would classify them unfairly.79 Relaxing the "whole brain
death" criteria for anencephaly may lead to relaxing the criteria for
other persons with disabilities, for example, those with
hydrencephaly or microencephaly.8o Finally, there is substantial
opposition to anencephalic organ donation by neurologists and pe
diatricians who argue that any person with a brain stem is alive and
therefore cannot be a source of donor organs. 81
V.

LEGAL ISSUES SURROUNDING ORGAN DONATION BY
. ANENCEPHALIC INFANTS

A.

The Parental Right to Withhold Treatment

Hospital counsel and ethics committees must consider whether
parents have a right to withhold treatment from their anencephalic
infant. Generally speaking, parents have a right to withhold treat
ment from their children. 82 In fact, parents have a constitutional
right to make several decisions for their children. 83 However, when
the patient is a newborn infant, statutes often limit the choices
79. See supra note 61 (explaining that the ACPD filed an amicus brief in the
T.A.c.P. case). See generally Krischer v. Mciver, 697 So. 2d 97, 101-02 (briefly explain
ing the views of the ACPD).
80. One advocate for the disabled has written the following:
Children born with disabilities deserve the same respect and honor as able
bodied infants. Somehow, in the quest for medical breakthroughs, we have
forgotten what is decent and fair. The issue is not what will make parents feel
better or meet the needs of others but what is right for this child! It doesn't
matter if a baby has 6 seconds or 60 years to live. What does matter is that any
child born with a disability has value and deserves to be recognized as such.
Brenda Bondurant, Babies and Organs, VIRGINIA-PILOT, July 27, 1995, at A12. See
supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "whole brain death"
standard.
81. As one neurologist interested in the issue of anencephalic organ donation ex
plains, neurologists are "the keepers of the holy grail" in deciding who is alive and who
is not. "Our job," she explains, is "to keep things clear," not to be swayed by the good
it might do for others if a baby is declared dead. Referring to the slippery slope, the
doctor explained that as far as brain function is concerned, anencephalic infants are in
exactly the same situation as people in permanent vegetative states: both lack all but
brain stem function. Nevertheless, there is no movement to declare persons in a perma
nent vegetative state dead for any reason, including the taking of organs. Interview
with Carol Leicher, M.D., Associate Professor of Pediatrics and Neurology, University
of Connecticut School of Medicine, in Hartford, Conn. (June 30, 1996).
82. See In re L.H.R., 221 S.E.2d 716, 722 (Ga. 1984) (allowing the withholding of
treatment from a patient in a chronic vegetative state).
83. See generally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (allowing Amish par
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available to parents. For example, the Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment and Adoption Reform statutes, commonly referred to as
the Baby Doe statutes, provide that doctors and parents are prohib
ited from subjecting an infant to medical neglect.84 The Baby Doe
statutes provide that treatment can be withheld from an infant with
a life threatening condition only under a set of very specific circum
stances. Treatment need not be offered when:
(A) the infant is chronically and irreversibly comatose;
(B) the provision of such treatment would (i) merely prolong dy
ing, (ii) not be effective in ameliorating or correcting all of the
infant's life threatening conditions, or (iii) otherwise be futile in
terms of the survival of the infant; or
(C) the provision of such treatment would be virtually futile in
terms of the survival of the infant and the treatment itself under
such circumstances would be inhumane. 85

Application of the Baby Doe statutes to anencephalic infants is
quite complicated. The term "futile" is legally and medically am
biguous. What, for example, is the time frame of the futility? Min
utes, days, or years? Looking at another aspect of the statute,
counsel may wonder what would constitute inhumane treatment of
an infant if it cannot suffer. 86 Are we sure that anencephalic infants
do not suffer? The question remains, do the parents of an
ents to ignore a compulsory school attendance law due to its conflict with the parents'
fundamental right to guide their children's religious beliefs).
84. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5107, 5111-5119c (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
85. [d. § 5106g (emphasis added).
86. The philosopher Hans Jonas disagrees with an interpretation of the Baby Doe
statutes which concludes that an infant who cannot feel does not have to be treated
humanely. There is an obligation we all have to treat living creatures with respect,
regardless of their ability to process or understand pain. See infra Part VI.E for a dis
cussion of the views of Hans Jonas.
'
Until quite recently, no infant was given anesthesia before surgery because current
medical wisdom held that their brains, though intact, were not developed sufficiently to
experience pain. This has been roundly disproved. The case of anencephalic infants
not feeling pain seems stronger since these infants lack the higher brain function cur
rently believed to be necessary to perceive pain. The issue of pain and suffering coats
the surface of the larger issue of whether these anencephalic infants are human, and
therefore entitled to basic human rights. Would it, for example, be appropriate to use
an anencephalic infant for vivisection? The AMA seems to be dangerously close to
asking this question in their effort to determine definitively if anencephalic infants feel.
It is this author's opinion that whether these infants feel or not, they are human and
entitled to full human rights. Viewed in this light, an anencephalic infant has the same
rights as any human to forego medical treatment when that treatment would not result
in a clear, long-term benefit.
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anencephalic infant have the right to refuse treatment? The answer
would appear to be yes.
Parents arguably have a right to refuse treatment for their
anencephalic infant as analogous case law already supports this
proposition. 87 There has been, however, no legal case questioning a
parent's decision to withhold or withdraw life saving technology
from an anencephalic infant. Given the strong consensus in the
medical community that anencephaly is a condition incompatible
with life,88 it is unlikely that an interloper could, through the legal
system, force parents to treat an anencephalic infant.
The Baby Doe statutes state explicitly that treatment is not re
quired when the infant is permanently unconscious. This overriding
principle cuts through the haze of futility and suffering to arrive at
the core issue that these infants lack the brain tissue necessary for
consciousness. Still, hospitals must determine whether they them
selves have an obligation to treat an anencephalic infant.
B.

The Hospital's Obligation to Treat: Baby K's Case

In 1992, a child, known to the courts as Baby K, was diagnosed
prenatally with anencephaly.89 Baby K's mother did not want to
abort; rather, she wanted to continue with the pregnancy.90 As
soon as she was born, Baby K began having difficulty breathing and
was placed on life support equipment. 91 The physicians made a de
finitive diagnosis of anencephaly and recommended that the sup
port be removed and a "Do Not Resuscitate" ("DNR") order be
entered. 92 Baby K's mother refused. 93 This refusal set in motion a
series of events that culminated in two well-publicized court deci
sions, one in the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis
trict of Virginia94 and one in the United States Court of Appeals for
87. This prediction is based on the case law allowing parents to refuse conven
tional treatment for their child so long as the conventional treatment has a very low
probability of success. See, e.g., In re Hofbauer, 398 N.E.2d 1009 (N.Y. 1979) (allowing
parents to treat cancer in their child with nutritional or metabolic therapy based on the
recommendation of a licensed physician that it was a valid therapy despite contrary
arguments that it was not the most often used therapy).
88. See Task Force, supra note 2, at 671.
89. See In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1025 (E.D. Va. 1993), affd, 16 F.3d 590
(4th Cir. 1994).
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Va. 1993), affd, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.
1994).
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the Fourth Circuit. 95
The treating physicians eventually took the matter to the hos
pital's ethics committee, which decided that a DNR order was ap
propriate. 96 The baby's mother, however, known to the court as
Ms. H, disagreed with the ethics committee and arranged to have
Baby K transferred to a nursing home with the understanding that
if she were again in respiratory distress, the hospital would readmit
her. 97 Over the next two and one-half years, Baby K returned to
the hospital several times for resuscitation and respiratory sup
port. 98 The hospital and its medical staff were being asked to do far
more than "allow" the baby to live; they were being asked to do all
that was medically possible to keep her alive. Finally, the hospital,
joined by the baby's father and a court appointed guardian for
Baby K, sought a declaratory judgment to cease ventilator treat
ment in the case of future respiratory distress. 99
The district court refused to issue a declaratory order and
found instead that removal of life support would violate specific
provisions of three different Acts: the Emergency Treatment and
Active Labor Act ("EMTALA"), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA").100 The Fourth
Circuit, considering only EMTALA, upheld the district court's rul
ing that the hospital's withdrawal of life support would violate the
statute. 101 The court noted that EMTALA requires a hospital to
either stabilize or transfer any patient. 102 The court stated that "the
hospital must provide that treatment necessary to prevent the mate
rial deterioration of [each patient's medical] condition," regardless
95. In re Baby "K", 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994).
96. See Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1025.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 1025-26. One interesting discussion of the Baby K case considers
the ethical issues her care raised with the nursing staff. Many of the nurses caring for
her felt that she had no viable quality of life and that it was therefore immoral to keep
her alive. For example, "[i]n an average week, this child would be suctioned over 200
times, receive trach care 21 times, have blood drawn at least 2 times, and be manipu
lated in some other way to receive care 300 times or more." Cindy Hylton Rushton,
The Baby K Case: Ethical Challenges of Preserving Professional Integrity, 21 PEDIATRIC
NURSING 367, 368 (1995).
99. See Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1026.
100. See id. at 1026-29; see also Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act, 42 U.S.c. § 1395dd (1994); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.c. §§ 701-797b
(1994 & Supp. II 1996); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101
12213 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
101. See In re Baby "K", 16 F.3d 590, 598 (4th Cir. 1994).
102. See id. at 594.
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of the long term prognosis of the patient. 103 The Fourth Circuit did
not discuss the other statutes. Ultimately, the United States
Supreme Court declined to hear the case, thus making the Fourth
Circuit decision fina1. 104
The Baby K case did not directly concern organ donation, but
it may be crucial to an understanding of the outer boundaries of
parents' rights regarding the treatment of anencephalic infants.
Although the decisions did not discuss the issue of organ donation,
it is arguable that the issue falls within the courts' decisions. How
ever, a recent analysis of the Baby K decisions, as they relate to
anencephalic organ donation, concludes that neither the legal deci
sions, nor the statutes consider~d by the courts have any bearing on
parental decisions to donate the organs of an anencephalic in
fant.1 05 Instead, the case focused on a hospital's duty to treat an
anencephalic infant at the parent's insistence. Thus, the case is rele
vant only to resolving issues regarding the duties of a hospital to
administer care at the insistence of an outside party, rather than the
issue of ceasing such care for purposes of organ donation. For in
stance, within the scope of the Baby K decisions, there may be an
issue as to whether third parties can force a hospital to treat an
anencephalic infant despite a decision by the baby's parents not to
treat that infant.
The district court, in Baby K, undertook a careful and cogent
constitutional analysis of the matter. It found that a parent has a
due process right under the United States Constitution to raise a
child as he or she wishes.106 This right extends to parentaP07 deci
103. Id.
104. However, Judge Sprouse, dissenting from the Fourth Circuit Majority Opin
ion, wrote the following: "In my view, Congress, even in its weakest moments, would
not have attempted to impose federal control in this sensitive, private area." Id. at 598
(Sprouse, J., dissenting). Instead, Judge Sprouse stated that EMTALA should be ap
plied on a case by case basis, not as a blanket requirement to treat. See id. at 599
(Sprouse, J., dissenting).
105. See Mary Crossley, Infants with Anencephaly, the ADA, and the Child Abuse
Amendments, 11 ISSUES L. & MED. 379, 403-06 (1996).
106. See In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1030 (E.D. Va. 1993), affd, 16 F.3d 590
(4th Cir. 1994).
107. It is interesting to note that in the Baby K case, the mother and father dis
agreed about the implementation of a DNR order. Citing Ms. H's religious beliefs in
favor of life, the court decided that the mother's decision to continue rescusitations
would prevail over the interests of the baby's father. See id. It should be noted that the
United States Supreme Court expressed a limited bias in favor of choosing life in
Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277-79 (1990) (deciding not to
withdraw life support from an adult despite parental wish that it be withdrawn).
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sions regarding the medical care of children. lOS The district court
noted that "there [will be] a 'presumption that ... parents act in the
best interests of [their] child' because the 'natural bonds of affec
tion lead parents to act in the best interests of their children. "'109
Therefore, the court appeared to be interested in protecting paren
tal decisions as opposed to simply protecting any decision to con
tinue a child's life. As such, a third party may have difficulty
challenging a parental decision to cease treatment.
C.

The Obligation to Donate Organs

Another issue that arises in the context of organ donation by
anencephalic infants is whether there is an obligation to donate or
gans. United States law, for the most part, imposes no obligation
on any person to help or rescue another person in the absence of a
clearly defined legal duty.110 This lack of an obligation contrasts
with the duty to rescue found in European and other civil law coun
tries. 1ll In the United States, a strong man may watch a child
drown, and as long as he has played no role in placing that child in
danger, he will face no legal consequences, either civil or criminal,
by failing to save the child. 1l2
108. See Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1030 (citing Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603-04
(1979) (dealing with parents' right to commit child to a mental institution».
109. Id. at 1030 (quoting Parham, 442 U.S. at 602).
110. See Jay Silver, The Duty to Rescue: A Reexamination and Proposal, 26 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 423, 424 (1985). However, a few states have enacted "Duty to Res
cue" laws. For example, Vermont has enacted a statute that reads as follows:
(a) A person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm shall,
to the extent that the same can be rendered without danger or peril to himself
or without interference with important duties owed to others, give reasonable
assistance to the exposed person unless that assistance or care is being pro
vided by others.
(c) A person who willfully violates subsection (a) of this section shall be fined
not more than $100.00.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.05 (West 1988).
111. The United States Constitution's emphasis on individual rights is what distin
guishes the United States from many other nations. In countries using the Civil or
Napoleonic law system, individuals are often charged with a duty to help others. For
example, both Germany and the former Soviet Union impose a duty on citizens to
rescue one another. See Ross A. Albert, Restitutionary Recovery for Rescuers, 74 CAL.
L. REv. 85, 107, 109-10 (1986).
112. See Handiboe v. McCarthy, 151 S.E.2d 905 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966) (finding no
liability against a defendant who failed to rescue the plaintiff's four year old boy from a
swimming pool); see also Osterlind v. Hill, 160 N.E. 301 (Mass. 1928) (holding in favor
of a defendant who ignored loud cries for help from a man hanging onto an overturned
canoe).
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The harsh, individualistic concept embodied in the absence of a
duty to rescue in the United States has been addressed by the
courts in the context of medical rescue. In McFall v. Shrimp,l13 a
man was dying of aplastic anemia and his only hope for survival was
to receive a bone marrow transplant from his first cousin. 114 How
ever, the cousin refused to donate. The dying man appealed to a
Pennsylvania court, seeking to force his cousin to donate by arguing
that the process, while painful, would do the cousin no harm.115
The court refused his request stating that "[o]ur society, contrary to
many others, has as its first principle, the respect for the individual,
and that society and government exist to protect the individual
from being invaded and hurt by another. "116
The protection from forcible donation after death is equally
strong, if not so clearly rooted, in the law. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Brotherton v. Cleveland,117 re
cently recognized a wife's right to claim control of her husband's
dead body. In Brotherton, the wife of a car accident victim was
asked at the hospital if she would donate her husband's organs. She
declined based on her husband's aversion to such a gift.118 None
theless, when the coroner received the body for autopsy, he re
moved the corneas and donated them to an eye bank. 119 The wife
brought a civil rights action claiming that her property, the body of
her husband, had been taken by the state without due process. 120
The district cour~ dismissed the case stating that "Ohio does not
give a surviving custodian a property interest in the body of a dece
dent."121 The Sixth Circuit, however, allowed her claim,122 finding
that the Ohio Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 123 governs whether a
relative has an interest in a dead body and "expressly grants a right
to [the next of kin] to control the disposal of ... the body."124 The
court held that the wife had an interest in control of the body, even
though that interest was not necessarily characterized as a property
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (1978).
See id. at 90.
See id.
Id. at 91.
923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991).
See id. at 478.
See id.
See id. at 478-79.
Id. at 479.
See id.
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2108.01-.99 (Banks-Baldwin 1994).
Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 482.
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right. 125 Instead, the court held that the interest was a "legitimate
claim of entitlement" protected by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 126
A well-reported Chicago case again presented the issue of in
voluntary donation. Curran v. Bosze 127 involved a twelve year-old
boy who was dying of leukemia and in need of a bone marrow
transplant. 128 No one in his immediate family was a compatible do
nor; however, there were three and one-half year-old twins from a
subsequent relationship of the boy's father who may have been
compatible. 129 The boy's father petitioned the court to force testing
of the twins.13° The twins' mother, with whom the father shared
custody, refused. 131 After extensive proceedings, during which psy
chiatrists, anesthesiologists, bone marrow donors, and parents of
children who had donated bone marrow to siblings testified, the
court upheld the mother's refusal. 132 The court reasoned that
although the testing and donation would not be unduly painful to
the children, considering their mother's refusal, neither the testing
nor the donation could be deemed to be within the twins' best inter
ests.133 Therefore, the best interests of the prospective donors were
given precedence over the best interest of the dying half-brother. 134
In another of the few reported cases on this issue, In re Rich
ardson,135 parents in Louisiana sought to donate a kidney from
their retarded seventeen year-old son to their thirty-two year-old
125. See id.
126. [d.
127. 566 N.E.2d 1319 (III. 1990).
128. See id. at 1321; see also Nancy Gibbs, The Gift of Life-or Else, TIME, Sep.
10, 1990, at 70.
129. See Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1321.
130. See id. at 1320-21.
131. See id. at 1321.
132. See id. at 1344-45.
133. See id. at 1344. "Only where there is an existing relationship between a
healthy child and his or her ill sister or brother maya psychological benefit to the child
from donating bone marrow to a sibling realistically be found to exist." Id.
134. The court wrote the following:
No matter how small the hope that a bone marrow transplant will cure [the
older boy] the fact remains that without the transplant [the older boy] will
almost certainly die. The sympathy felt by this court, the circuit court, and all
those who have learned of [the older boy's] tragic situation cannot, however,
obscure the fact that, under the circumstances presented in the case at bar, it
neither would be proper under existing law nor in the best interests of the 3 1/
2-year-old twins for the twins to participate in the bone marrow harvesting
procedure.
Id. at 1345.
135. 284 So. 2d 185 (La. Ct. App. 1973).
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daughter who was suffering from "an almost total loss of kidney
function."136 The Louisiana Court of Appeals noted that although
it had heard testimony from the boy, his retardation left him with
the mental capacity of "a 3 or 4 year old child."137 Applying the
"ultimate best interest of a minor" test, the court denied permission
for the transplant, holding that since a minor was not allowed to
donate property "it is inconceivable to us that [the law] affords less
protection to a minor's right to be free in his person from bodily
intrusion to the extent of loss of an organ unless such loss be in the
best interest of the minor."138
As a practical matter, donations between family members usu
ally take place without legal intervention. Although sometimes
hospital attorneys seek a declaratory judgment from the court
before the procedure takes place, these opinions are often not re
ported decisions.139 When both parents give their consent to an in
tra-family donation, court intervention is rare.
The extent to which intra-family donation is accepted as rou
tine is highlighted by the Ayala scenario in which parents of a girl,
Anissa, dying of chronic myelogenous leukemia conceived another
child to serve as a bone marrow donor. 140 Despite protests by
136. Id. at 186.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 187.
139. See Melvin Lewis, Kidney Donation by a 7-Year-Old Identical Twin Child, 13
J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 221, 229 (1974) (explaining that hospitals often seek
declaratory judgments before acting, but that such orders are seldom reported).
140. See David Grogan et aI., To Save Their Daughter from Leukemia, Abe and
Mary Ayala Conceived a Plan-and a Baby, PEoPLE, Mar. 5, 1990, at 44; Anastasia
Toufexis, Creating a Child to Save Another: A "Miracle Baby" Promises Both Blessings
and Controversy, TIME, Mar. 5, 1990, at 56. Interestingly, the Ayalas were driven to this
extreme measure because an anonymous perfect bone marrow match refused, at the
last minute, to serve as a donor. See Grogan et aI., supra. Although, at that time, the
anonymous donor was the only identifiable person who could save Anissa's life, there
was no legal basis for compelling him to do so. See supra notes 110-12 and accompany
ing text (explaining the lack of duty to rescue laws in the United States).
The Ayala case takes on a new meaning in the context of the current issue of clon
ing. In a case like the Ayalas', creating a clone of Anissa, their sick daughter, would
have assured a compatible bone marrow donor. As future parents seek compatible
bone marrow for their dying children, what will prevent them, when technology ad
vances to the cloning of humans, from creating another baby with exactly the same
genetic make-up? As societal opinion now stands, no authority can prevent adults from
procreating. If the parents are willing to welcome and raise a new child, why would the
fact that the new baby is guaranteed to save a sibling's life weigh against the
conception?
What if, however, the organ required was a heart rather than bone marrow? Par
ents would not be allowed to use this new mentally intact child as an organ donor. This
brief discussion of cloning in the context of the anencephalic serves to clarify the diffi
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ethicists such as George Annas, who declared in Time magazine
that "children aren't medicine for other people," there were no
legal efforts to stop the Ayalas from conceiving the child or to pre
vent the new baby from becoming a donor. l4l When the baby,
Marissa, reached the age of fourteen months, her marrow was ex
tracted and transplanted into Anissa. 142 Five years later, Anissa
was free of cancer. 143 In an interview with CNN, Marissa explained
"I saved her life. "144
D.

Parents' Right to Choose Donation

An issue that clouds discussion of anencephalic organ donation
is whether donation is the parents' choice. If the parents of an acci
dent victim may choose to donate their child's organs, why can the
parents of an anencephalic infant not do the same? The legal an
swer is that there is a difference between a living child, which has
the right to have its best interests protected by the state,145 and a
dead child, which belongs to its parents alone. 146 Parents do not
own their living children, although they do have constitutional
rights to make decisions for them. 147 The parental right to make
decisions for one's children stops short of actions which endanger
the child in question. 148 Just as a parent may not risk a child's life,
the parent also should not have an unfettered right to use the child
cult underlying issue: when is it acceptable to look at a baby as a source for organs
rather than as a valuable person in its own right? Presumably, everyone would agree
that it would not be permissible for parents to create a clone and then end the ensuing
baby's life by taking an essential organ, regardless of another child's need for that or
gan. This stems from the fundamental principle that one life should not be taken just to
save another.
141. Toufexis, supra note 140, at 56.
142. See Claudia Glenn Dowling, Miraculous Babies, LIFE, Dec. 1993, at 75, 75.
143. See Robert Jablon, Miracle Gift Lasts 5th Year; Baby Conceived to Give Own
Sister Marrow Transplant, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, June 16, 1996, at 6A.
144. (CNN television broadcast, June 9, 1996).
145. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("[T]he family itseH is
not beyond regulation in the public interest ... [a]nd neither rights of religion nor rights
of parenthood are beyond limitation.").
146. For example, Connecticut statutes provide that "the custody and control of
the remains of deceased residents of this State shall belong to the ... next of kin."
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-318 (1997).
147. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (noting a historical recog
nition of freedom of choice in family matters).
148. See Custody of a Minor, 393 N.E.2d 836 (Mass. 1979) (requiring standard
medical treatment despite parents' wishes to rely on vitamin therapy). But see In re
Hofbauer, 393 N.E.2d 1009 (N.Y. 1979) (allowing parents to treat cancer with nutri
tional therapy).
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as an organ donor .149
The debate over anencephalic organ donation takes place in
the context of a fierce desire by some parents of dying children to
have their children serve as organ donors. For example, a father of
a seven year-old boy killed in an accident explained his feeling that
knowing the boy's "organs live on in someone else is [like] an ex
tension of his life that has made his death somewhat more beara
ble. "150 Such sentiments are hardly discouraged by doctors and
hospitals that perform transplants. 151 In fact, parents often see or
gan donation as a positive aspect of what would otherwise be un
mitigated tragedy: the untimely death of a loved one.
This desire on the part of parents has led to reported cases of
organ donation by anencephalic infants. For instance, recently an
anencephalic baby, Baby Gabriel, was delivered at term despite her
parent's knowledge of her condition. 152 Shortly after birth, she was
pronounced dead and transferred to Lorna Linda University Medi
cal Center in Los Angeles. When the doctors determined that Baby
Gabriel had no chance of ever breathing on her own, she was re
moved from a ventilator and her heart was successfully trans
planted to a critically ill infant, Baby Paul, who had hypoplastic left
heart syndrome. 153
Following the Baby Gabriel transplant, Lorna Linda suspended
its program to harvest donor organs from anencephalic infants be
cause of a lack of public consensus regarding when these infants can
be deemed dead.1 54 Dr. Leonard Bailey, the infant heart surgeon at
Lorna Linda, stressed that the program was only interested in
anencephalic infants who could be declared brain dead. He ex
149. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 170 (explaining that parents are free to martyr them
selves, but that they are not free "to make martyrs of their children before they have
reached the age of full and legal discretion").
150. Elisabeth Rosenthal, Parents Find Solace in Donating Organs, N.Y. TIMES,
May 11, 1993, at C1. Voicing a similar perspective, a mother of a nineteen year-old
killed in a riding accident said "I wanted some good to come out of it. It seemed mor
ally wrong to bury those organs when somebody else could use them." Id.
151. For example, Dr. Jonathan Slater, a child psychiatrist associated with the
pediatric cardiac transplantation team at Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center's Ba
bies Hospital in New York, reports that "[djonating doesn't lessen [the parents'j pain,
but it can give them a tremendous sense of continuity-that the loss has not been for
naught-and that can be very helpful." Id.
152. See Annas, supra note 16, at 36.
153. See Brandon, supra note 30, at 782 (citing Sandra Blakeslee, Baby Without
Brain Kept Alive to Give Heart, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1987, at AI); see also Annas, supra
note 16, at 36.
154. See Shewmon et aI., supra note 16, at 1773.
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plained, "I am not wacko; I am part of humanity. . .. I would not
take the heart out of anybody who is still breathing and moving and
kicking around."155 Baby Gabriel's mother reported afterward that
she was "probably one of the proudest people around-to know
another little human being is alive when you've lost your own child.
It's like smiling through tears. "156
A parent's legal rights, though, are highly fact specific. Parents
clearly have the right to dispose of their child's body as they wish
once there is a declaration of death.157 In practical terms, this
means that the parents can donate, without restriction, the organs
that can be harvested from a body after the termination of respira
tion and heartbeat, including corneas and heart valves. 158 The par
ents can also offer the dead body of their child for medical
research. 159 The remaining and more difficult question 'concerns
the donation of solid organs that must be retrieved while the body
is still oxygenated.
E.

When May Organs Be Removed?

Determining when organs may be removed is an important
question because the removal before death, or at least preservation
of certain organs, is medically necessary. The necessity arises be
cause the process of dying involves deprivation of oxygen that, for
the most part, renders the organs unusable. 160 Thus, there is a spe
cial sense of urgency when the patient is a potential organ donor.
As one doctor explains, "to wait for [the anencephalic infant] to die
in the traditional way-cardiorespiratory arrest-would render his
organs useless."161 After traditional death, the organs would be
155. Robert Steinbrook, Doctors Seek Means of Using Babies' Organs, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 12, 1987, Pt. 1, at 3.
156. Chartrand, supra note 7.
157. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-318 (1997) ("[T]he custody and control of
the remains of deceased residents of this State belong to the ... next of kin.").
158. See id.
159. See id.; see also VNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 3, 8A V.L.A. 40 (1993)
(defining who can make anatomical gifts of a decedent's body).
160. ct. D.C. CODE ANN. § 2.1509.1 (Supp. 1998) (allowing techniques that pre
serve organs to be employed by hospitals prior to actually obtaining consent to donate).
The New York Times has reported the following: "In Illinois, under a protocol devel
oped by the Regional Organ Bank of Illinois, ... [w]hen a person dies in an emergency
room or is dead on arrival, doctors may infuse a cold preserving fluid into the cadaver's
abdomen. Later, they will ask the family members for permission to take the organs."
Gina Kolata, Organ Shortage Leads to Nontraditional Transplants, and Ethical Con
cerns, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1993, at A15.
161. Fost, supra note 12, at 333.
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rendered useless because the natural suffocation that follows the
cessation of breathing in im anencephalic infant whose heart stops
beating makes harvesting the organs impossible.
However, there is a rule, commonly known as the "dead do
nor" rule, which states that a person must meet legal standards of
death before donating organs. Under the dead donor rule, if the
donor is still alive, his organs cannot be taken. 162 Thus, the rule
requires a diagnosis of brain death before organs can be donated.
This, however, may render several organs of an anencephalic infant
useless for purposes of organ donation. Therefore, several ap
proaches for redefining the standard of death have been articulated;
those approaches have been summarized by Dr. Norman Fost as
follows: (1) waiting for cardio-respiratory death; (2) waiting a pre
determined amount of time before declaring brain death; (3) rede
fining brain death as cortical death; (4) creating a separate category
of brain death, based on a diagnosis of anencephaly; or (5) aban
doning the dead donor rule entirely and allowing donations of vital
organs from living persons. 163 The following subsections discuss the
potential effectiveness of each of the proposed new standards of
death.
1.

Waiting for Death by Cardio-Respiratory Arrest

The first approach to reconciling legal standards of death with
anencephalic organ donation entails waiting for traditional death by
cardio-respiratory arrest and allows for a very clear demarcation
between life and death. However, after waiting for traditional
death, the heart and liver will be unusable due to the loss of oxygen
perfusion. l64 Therefore, waiting for traditional death will not in
crease the number of organs available for donation.
2.

Waiting a Predetermined Amount of Time Before
Declaring Brain Death

The second approach set forth by Dr. Fost for reconciling legal
standards of death with anencephalic organ donation requires wait
ing a predetermined amount of time for brain death.165 However,
162. See id. at 332-33. The root of the dilemma rests on the words "still alive." If
the issue were only the removal, or "harvesting" (the medical euphemism) of organs
from a dead body then there would be few legal difficulties. The parents of an
anencephalic infant could give such permission with no interference from the state.
163. See id. at 333-36.
164. See id. at 333.
165. See id.
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waiting this predetermined amount of time raises many practical
problems. Leaving aside the special issues raised by anencephaly,
the entire subject of declaring an infant brain dead by any medical
standard is a complex one. As Dr. Carol Leicher, a pediatric neu
rologist, explains, "no one has successfully devised a definition for
declaring brain death for neonates."166 This lack of definition likely
stems from the fact that infants may later develop brain functions
that they do not have at birth,167 Based on this phenomenon, the
Task Force for the Determination of Brain Death in Children has
published standards that call for a waiting period of seven days af
ter birth before declaring a newborn child to be brain dead. 168
For an anencephalic infant born with brain stem reflexes,169 the
policy promulgated by the Task Force would require at least a seven
day waiting period while the baby is observed for signs of brain
activity. This waiting period creates burdensome practical issues in
the neonatal intensive care unit. The parents may choose at any
time to withdraw life support and allow the child to die if they be
lieve that the burdens of treatment outweigh the benefits to the
baby. If, however, the baby is a potential organ donor, it must be
kept on life support equipment for a full seven days before it can be
declared dead. 170
Presumably, the anencephalic infant would be maintained on a
respirator and other life-support equipment for the full seven days.
Yet, there is no guarantee, or even a great likelihood, that an
166. Interview with Carol Leicher, M.D., Associate Professor of Pediatrics and
Neurology, University of Connecticut School of Medicine, in Hartford, Conn. (June 30,
1996).
167. See Joseph J. Volpe, Brain Death Determination in the Newborn, 80 PEDIAT
RICS 293, 294-95 (1987).
168. See Task Force for the Determination of Brain Death in Children, Guide
lines for the Determination of Brain Death in Children, 37 NEUROLOGY 1077, 1077-78
(1987).
169. There are at least 14 recognized signs of brain stem activity ranging from
spontaneous respiration to a gag reflex. See Paul A. Byrne & Richard G. Nilges, The
Brain Stem in Brain Death: A Critical Review, 9 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 3, 9-12 (1993).
One test to determine brain death is a brain electrical activity, an EEG; however, in an
anencephalic infant it is not useful because it measures higher brain activity, not brain
stem activity. See id. at 14.
170. See Task Force for the Determination of Brain Death in Children, supra
note 168, at 1077-78. As one commentator notes,
"only in the small minority of cases are questions concerning termination of
life support or decisions to ternlinate such support made on the basis of a
diagnosis of brain death. Indeed, most commonly, decisions concerning the
termination of life support are formulated on the basis of the best interests of
the devastatingly ill infant."
Volpe, supra note 167, at 296-97.
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anencephalic infant will be any closer to a legal standard of death
after seven days.171 The infant may still have some brain stem func
tions that prevent a declaration of death under the current, "whole
brain death" standard. l72 Also, during the waiting period, the in
fant would most likely have to be repeatedly resuscitated.
Recognizing this problem, parents of anencephalic infants seek
to have their children declared dead at or before birth so that or
gans may be obtained. In a procedure that has become routine in
harvesting organs from accident victims, a declaration of brain
death allows the body to be supported by "life support" machinery
that keeps the heart beating and lungs pumping. 173 Thus, the or
gans are kept viable until removed, at which point the machines are
turned off.174
3.

Redefining Brain Death as Cortical Death

The third approach to reconciling legal standards of death with
anencephalic infant organ donation would require redefining brain
171. Interview with Carol Leicher, M.D., Associate Professor of Pediatrics and
Neurology, University of Connecticut School of Medicine, in Hartford, Conn. (June 30,
1996).
172. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "whole
brain death" standard.
173. An article in the New York Times describes one family's experience as
follows:
After Mark Flanagan had been declared brain dead and his parents had con
sented to donate his organs ... the Flanagans stayed with Mark, who was still
on life support but officially dead, placing blankets on his body "to keep him
warm and help preserve the organs." Five hours later recipients were waiting,
and surgeons were poised to operate. "Those hours were a peaceful time with
him," said Mrs. Flanagan. "But it was very difficult seeing him wheeled off,
then the doors close, then that's it."
Rosenthal, supra note 150.
174. See Kolata, supra note 160. The University of Pittsburgh Medical Center has
developed a protocol which begins
when a person who is being kept alive on a respirator asks that the respirator
be turned off and that his or her organs be removed for transplanting. The
patient is [then] weaned from the respirator in an operating room, with sur
geons standing by to remove the organs two minutes after the heart stops.
Id. This practice has been criticized by Dr. Renee Fox, a University of Pennsylvania
sociologist, who commented that
she was appalled not only by "this almost desecrated death but also by the
almost predatory degree to which we are trying to get organs." She also ques
tions the idea of a timed death "in a freezing cold operating room, in the inte
rior of a hospital, totally removed from friends and family and from anyone
who had taken care of one."
Id.
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death as cortical death.175 This redefinition would designate
anencephalic infants dead, even if born breathing, because they
lack higher, cortical, brain function.
The strongest argument against changing the definition of
death from "whole brain death" to "cortical" death, which would
result in an exception for anencephalic infants, is that this redefini
tion could lead to further efforts at harvesting organs from people
who are not now considered dead. Changing the law to make it
easier to obtain organs from anencephalic infants could be the first
step, however, down a slippery slope of obtaining organs from
others in similar situations. This could include other people without
consciousness, most notably those in a permanent vegetative state.
In fact, the category could be expanded to include people who are
conscious but have very short life expectancies, such as babies with
fatal defects. Even more troublesome is the possibility of ex
panding the definition to include those with consciousness and a
normal life expectancy, but who will always be severely impaired
and unable to take care of themselves; this might include the men
tally or physically handicapped. The slippery slope implications of
changing the definition of death buttress the fervent opposition to
anencephalic organ donation by groups that oppose it, such as the
National Right to Life Committee and commentators who are trou
bled by the implication of the change. 176
Further, there is tangible evidence to support the concerns of
the slippery slope. For instance, it is chilling to hear that surgeons
in West Germany report removing the kidneys of an anencephalic
infant before brain death without any legal ramificationsp7 In ad
dition, Dr. Joyce Peabody, the chief of neonatology at Lorna Linda
Hospital, reported that during the time Lorna Linda was seeking
anencephalic infants as sources of organ transplants, she received a
number of referrals from doctors of patients who did not have
anencephaly.178 Instead, they had other impairments; for instance,
175. See Fost, supra note 12, at 334-35 (focusing on loss of higher brain functions
rather than all brain function as a standard of death).
176. The National Right to Life Committee has expressed a strong opposition to
anencephalic organ donation. They write that "[b]asing 'personhood' on cognitive abil
ity-abhorrent enough when applied to anencephalic infants-will inevitably be ap
plied to others." Leslie Bond & Dave Andrusko, Harvesting the Living, in A PASSION
FOR JUSTICE: A PRo-LIFE REVIEW OF 1987 AND A LoOK AHEAD To 1988, at 83, 95
(Dave Andrusko ed. 1988); see also J.e. Willkie & David Andrusko, Personhood
Redux, HASTINGS CENTER REp., Oct.-Nov. 1988, at 30-33.
177. See generally Holzgreve et aI., supra note 63.
178. See Shewmon et aI., supra note 16, at 1775.
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a neurologically intact baby born without kidneys. Describing these
referrals, Dr. Peabody reported, "I have become educated by the
experience.... The slippery slope is real."179
4.

Creating a Separate Category of Brain Death Based on a
Diagnosis of Anencephaly

The fourth approach to reconciling legal standards of death
with anencephalic infant organ donation would create a separate
category of brain death for anencephalic infants.180 Thus, an infant
diagnosed with anencephaly would be legally dead. This proposal
puts great importance on diagnosis, since the diagnosis of
anencephaly would be an automatic declaration of death. This is
troublesome, as there are a range of neurological impairments that
fall short of true anencephaly, and a declaration of death would
depend on the diagnostic skills of the attending physician.181
5. Abandoning the Dead Donor Rule Entirely
The final approach to reconciling legal standards of death with
anencephalic infant organ donation imagines abandoning the dead
donor rule altogether, thus permitting donation from anencephalic
infants and persons in permanent vegetative states. 182 However,
some argue that loosening standards for organ procurement would
cause a loss of public confidence in the entire organ donation
process. 183
VI.

ApPLICATION OF ETHICAL THEORY TO ORGAN DONATION
BY ANENCEPHALIC INFANTS

Ethical theory plays a significant role in the actions of a hospi
tal team following a diagnosis of anencephaly. There is a well de
veloped body of philosophy concerning the ethical obligations of
health professionals.1 84 As Dr. Melvin Lewis concluded in an im
portant discussion of a case involving organ donation between
twins, "[i]n an absolute sense, no one can ever know what is ulti
[d. (alteration in original).
180. See Fost, supra note 12, at 334.
181. See id. at 335.
182. See id.
183. See CEJA, supra note 68, at 1617.
184. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDI.
CAL ETHICS 7 (4th ed. 1994) ("Health care professions typically specify and enforce
obligations, thereby seeking to ensure that persons who enter into relationships with
their members will find them competent and trustworthy.").
179.
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mately the right choice: we simply cannot forecast the future."185
Most likely, the ethical issues surrounding organ donation by
anencephalic infants will have to be discussed by hospital ethics
committees. The following sections highlight a number of ethical
theories that may be relevant to such discussions.
A.

Bioethical Theory

As described by Tom Beauchamp and James Childress in their
leading book entitled Principles of Biomedical Ethics, "ethical the
ory can illuminate problems in health care" by clarifying the rela
tionship between what we do and what we think is the right thing to
do,186 The issue of anencephalic organ donation can be analyzed
according to Beauchamp and Childress' four cardinal principles of
bioethical theory: autonomy, justice, non maleficence , and
beneficence. 187
1.

Autonomy

Autonomy involves respecting a "person's right to hold views,
to make choices, and to take actions based on personal values and
beliefs."188 This stems from Immanuel Kant's argument that each
person must have "the capacity to determine his or her own
destiny."189 When the individual in question is not competent to
make his or her own decisions, Beauchamp and Childress recognize
a hierarchy of three standards for surrogate decision making. 190
These three standards are as follows: pure autonomy, substituted
judgment, and decisions based on the patient's best interests. 191
Since pure autonomy is based on respecting a patient's previously
expressed wishes, only the substituted judgment and best interests
analyses are relevant in the case of an anencephalic infant who has
never been conscious and could not have expressed any wishes.
185. Lewis, supra note 139, at 235. Discussing the psychological issues raised by
using a seven year-old girl as a kidney donor for her identical twin, Dr. Lewis came to
the conclusion that in the case of this particular child, "[h]er cognitive and emotional
development, including her reality testing, were such that she did not appear to be in
danger of experiencing the operation as an overwhelming threat." Id. at 234.
186. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 184, at 3.
187. See generally BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 184.
188. Id. at 125.
189. Id.
190. See id. at 170-81.
191. See id.; see also RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND
THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986) (providing greater depth into the analysis of
autonomy).
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The second standard, substituted judgment, requires the decision
maker to "make the decision the incompetent would have made if
competent."192
Since the substituted judgment standard also
presumes some former level of decision-making ability, it "cannot
meaningfully be applied in cases where the incompetent person was
never (or has not yet been) capable of making judgments or expres
sing wishes of his own."193 Accordingly, having ruled out the pure
autonomy and substituted judgment standard, only the best inter
ests standard remains. The best interests standard takes the deci
sion away from the patient and gives the surrogate authority to
make a decision in the best interests of the patient. 194 The patient's
best interests criteria is, therefore, the relevant model to look at
when parents make decisions for their anencephalic child.
Another question that arises when the patient is an infant is
whose autonomy is being infringed, the infant's or the parent's? If
the answer is the parent's autonomy, then allowing donation will
satisfy the parent's right to choose on behalf of his or her child. The
parent's right to choose becomes clouded when the parent's choice
causes death.195 Still, parents are allowed to make choices for their
severely ill infants, which result in the child's death. In cooperation
with the doctors' medical judgment, a parent is allowed to decide
that the burden of further treatment would not justify the benefit to
the baby. Upon making this decision, the parent can direct that the
child either be removed from life support equipment or not be re
suscitated if he stops breathing. 196
However, if the infant's autonomy is to take precedence over
the parent's autonomy, then many issues surface. Can an infant
who has never had consciousness have the right to autonomy? Can
his interests be separated from his parents? Does he have an inter
192. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 184, at 17l.
193. Ruth Macklin, Return to the Best Interests of the Child, in WHO SPEAKS FOR
TIlE CHILD: THE PROBLEMS OF PROXY CONSENT 265, 290 (Willard Gaylin & Ruth
Macklin eds., 1982).
194. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 184, at 178.
195. If an anencephalic infant is not dead, then the process of donating organs
will be the cause of death. Alexander Morgan Capron, writing on the problem of
anencephalic organ donation, notes "an anencephalic neonate whose heart and lungs
are functioning independently can not be considered brain dead. Indeed the baby
lives." Alexander Morgan Capron, Anencephalic Donors: Separating the Dead from the
Dying, HASTINGS CENTER REp., Feb. 1987, at 5, 5.
196. Taking another view, Arthur Caplan argues that the status of brain death is
clearest in the case of an anencephalic infant where there is no higher brain function.
See Arthur L. Caplan, Should Foetuses or Infants Be Utilized as Organ Donors?, 1
BIOETIlICS 119, 122 (1987).
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est in dying through the natural cessation of whatever brain func
tion he has left, rather than through the artificial process of organ
donation? Might not an infant, if allowed to choose, prefer to die
as a result of donating his organs? This question is less clear when
we consider that this is not a choice available to any person, con
scious or not. When a person has suffered the complete cessation
of brain function, he is dead by all legal and medical standards. If
that person then goes on to become an organ donor, it is an act that
has occurred after his death and does not cause death itself. No one
is allowed, either through advanced directives or through reliance
on substituted judgment, to sacrifice his own life for the purpose of
donating organs. If such a possibility were open, we might well im
agine that people would choose this option in advance should they
ever be in a permanent vegetative state. In fact, this option is not
available.
2.

Justice

Beauchamp and Childress describe justice as "distributive jus
tice," which is the "fair, equitable, and appropriate distribution in
society determined by justified norms that structure the terms of
social cooperation."197 John Rawls, a leading contemporary philos
opher of justice, views justice as fairness. 198 In determining
whether justice is satisfied, we must ask if the result is fair. Are like
cases being treated equally?199 Justice is particularly relevant in a
discussion of anencephalic organ donation. From the neurologist's
point of view, the perspective of justice raises the greatest barrier to
anencephalic organ donation. According to pediatric neurologist
Dr. Carol Leicher, an anencephalic infant with a functioning brain
stem is in exactly the same situation as a person in a permanent
vegetative state who retains brain stem reflexes. 2oo Neither has sat
isfied the requirements for whole brain death, which is the currently
accepted legal and medical standard for a declaration of death.201
197. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 184, at 327.
198. See id. at 340.
199. This is sometimes viewed as a matter of equality; however, a recent article by
Madison Powers challenges this Rawlsian perspective. See generally Madison Powers,
Forget About Equality, 61 KENNEDY INST. EnlIcs J. 129 (1996).
200. Interview with Carol Leicher, M.D., Associate Professor of Pediatrics and
Neurology, University of Connecticut School of Medicine, in Hartford, Conn. (June 30,
1996).
201. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "whole
brain death" standard.
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Is it, therefore, just to treat anencephalic infants differently from
persons in permanent vegetative states?
3.

Nonmaleficence

Nonmaleficence is the obligation of the medical profession not
to harm its patients. 202 The health professional's primary obligation
is to do no harm.203 Beauchamp and Childress explain that the ob
ligation to do no harm supersedes any possible collateral good re
sult of the harm.204 Nonmaleficence would seem, then, to forbid
both withdrawing and withholding treatment and the taking of or
gans from a living person, regardless of the shortness of that per
son's life span or the good the organs will do.
In the case of an anencephalic infant who retains brain stem
function, removal of organs would directly cause the infant's death.
Thus, harm would be done to the infant. Nonmaleficence, however,
does not mean that every measure must be taken to prolong a pa
tient's life, regardless of the consequences. Providing life sustaining
care might harm a patient who has no prospect of surviving his sick
ness. Beauchamp and Childress point out that, in some cases, ef
forts made to preserve life actually cause suffering. 205 How can a
standard based on pain and suffering be applied to an anencephalic
infant who presumably lacks the mental function to feel pain or to
suffer? One answer, addressing the core of the most troubling is
sues regarding anencephalic infants, is that, as humans,
anencephalic infants are entitled to the respect owed to all human
life forms. The question can then be asked whether treatment is
interfering with whatever quality of life the baby might experience,
for example, being held by her parents as she dies.
4.

Beneficence

Beneficence addresses the moral obligation in a health care
setting to contribute to the patient's welfare. 206 Many would argue
that organ donation is the ultimate expression of beneficence.
However, beneficence does not sanction doing harm to one person
for another's good. 207 For an act to be beneficent, it must also ben
efit, or at least have neutral consequences, for the patient. Harvest
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

See
See
See
See
See
See

BEAUCHAMP

id.
id.
id.
id.
id.

at
at
at
at

19l.
233.
259.
266.

&

CHILDRESS,

supra note 184, at 189.
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ing the organs of a patient not yet brain dead would not satisfy the
requirements of beneficence.
Indeed, analyzing any individual's duty of beneficence to an
other, a precondition of any obligation is the principle that the "ac
tion would not present significant risks, costs, or burdens" to the
giver. 208 In the case of organ donation before complete cessation of
brain function, the consequence to the patient/donor is death. Be
neficence has never been used to justify a situation in which one
person dies for the benefit of another. While no one can stop a
person from giving his life for another in an emergency, in a medi
cal setting, such beneficence would not be permitted. Parents
could not, for example, donate their own heart to their child in need
of a transplant.
A definitive change in law or public policy that accepts a less
than "whoie brain death" standard would likely affect both the be
neficence and nonmaleficence principles. For example, there are
viewpoints that receiving a blood transfusion is doing an extreme
harm. lehovahs Witnesses, for example, believe that receiving a
blood transfusion makes it impossible for them or their families to
enter heaven.209 Equally, there are those who believe that removal
of organs, even after death, causes harm. At the same time, these
are not universally held beliefs. These beliefs are reflected in cur
rent law by making receipt of medical treatment and donation of
organs voluntary. Those who do not want to receive a blood trans
fusion or be an organ donor are not required to do so. Yet, there is
no such option in the case of the "whole brain death" standard.
One cannot opt in or out of "whole brain death." It is questionable
whether the analogy to blood transfusions really holds. In the strict
sense, people are not declared brain dead according to their beliefs.
Less formally, however, a declaration of brain death is only made
when the patient is a potential organ donor. If, for religious or
other personal reasons, a patient does not wish to be an organ do
nor, it is unlikely that the medical staff will take the step of declar
ing him brain dead.
B.

The Virtues

Another ethical theory which may shape the decisions of ethics
208. Id.
209. See James E. Dougherty, Coronary Stent Placement as a Bridge to Coronary
Artery Byp"ass Surgery in an Unstable, Anemic Jehovah's Witness Patient: A Case Report
and Review of Bloodless Surgery Techniques, 61 CONN. MED. 195, 197 (1997).
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committees confronted with an anencephalic infant organ donation
scenario is that of "virtues." The theory of "virtues" developed
from Aristotle's principle of "arete," by which he meant the highest
form of doing an action. For Aristotle, virtue constituted not just
the act performed, but the state of mind of the person doing it. This
theory of virtue was expanded by St. Augustine, who identified the
cardinal virtues of prudence, courage, temperance, and justice. The
concept of the state of mind of the actor, his virtue, in regards to
medical decision making, was carried further by the major modern
proponents of this theory, Edmund Pellegrino and David Thom
asma in their book entitled The Virtues in Medical Practice. 210
Explaining the need for consideration of the virtues in medical
decision making, Pellegrino and Thomasma write that principlism,
the consideration of autonomy, justice, beneficence, and
nonmaleficence, "fails to take into sufficient account of the charac
ter of the agent, as well as the nuances of real life that situate and
define the moral quandary."211 For Pellegrino and Thomasma, it is
not enough that the medical professional makes the right decision,
but whether the decision is made for the right reason. For example,
a physician may respect a patient's wishes when they are in concert
with his own, but not when the physician disagrees with the patient.
Disrespect by a physician of a patient's wishes, simply because he
disagrees with the wishes, does not provide genuine respect for au
tonomy because the practitioner does not respect the patient as an
individual.2 12 For many people, the idea of causing an infant's
death, either by not resuscitating her or by removing her organs in
order to save another infant, is the sort of "wartime triage" that a
doctor of good c,haracter should guard against. However, Pelle
grino and Thomasma recognize that there are some situations in
which there is no common idea of good. 213 In those cases, "[a]
moral decision is not a decision about a principle, but about the
210. EDMUND D. PELLEGRINO & DAVID C. THOMASMA, THE VIRTUES IN MEDI
CAL PRACTICE (1993). For another discussion of virtues, see ALASDAIR MACINTYRE,
AfTER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1984).
211. PELLEGRINO & THOMASMA, supra note 210, at 101.
212. Pellegrino and Thomasma stress that attention to ethics and principles does
not guarantee a good result. For example, in writing about the abuses by doctors during
the holocaust they note that "the lessons to be learned from this experience are that all
individuals must be treated as ends in themselves, that the evils of wartime triage
should not become ordinary or accepted ethical practice." Id. at 15. They further write
that "only critically reflective medical ethics and self-critical individuals-of good charac
ter can offer some hope that history will not be repeated here." Id.
213. See id. at 18.
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relationship of circumstances, intentions, and ends toa princi
ple."214 Thus, a virtuous physician does not only "what is required
as duty but seek[s] the perfection-the excellence, the arete of a
particular virtue. "215 The virtuous person is therefore impelled by
his virtues to strive for perfection. 216 Striving for perfection con
trasts with settling for an adequate or acceptable result.
Using virtues such as justice and courage, an individual medical
practitioner must consult his own conscience when deciding
whether to prolong an anencephalic infant's life. 217 Regarding
anencephalic organ donation, a virtues based analysis would con
clude that the life of an anencephalic infant should have no less
value than the life of a healthy infant either because the infant lacks
consciousness or because of the great good that the anencephalic's
organs can do for another infant. The physician should seek moral
excellence in the care of his patient; he should not seek to achieve
the best result for society.
C.

Consequentialism

As a moral theory, the ethics of the virtues analysis stands op
posed to a consequentialist perspective which calls for performing
the act that will do the most good over all. 218 A consequentialist
looks to the benefit to society, perhaps in the form of making re
sources available to others through the withholding of treatment
from an anencephalic infant. The question asked by the consequen
tialist is whether an anencephalic's organs would help an otherwise
healthy baby who will die without an organ transplant. In other
words, the actual morality of an act, in this case ending the life of a
baby, can, under a consequentialist view, be weighed against the
good that act will create. Few members of hospital ethics commit
tees are strict consequentialists. However, it is important for this
theory to be recognized so that everyone involved can fully under
stand the implications of acting or not acting.
214. Id. at 23.
215. Id. at 166.
216. See id.
217. For Pellegrino and Thomasma, this would result in a decision not to sacrifice
the life of an anencephalic infant even for the purpose of saving other children. Quot
ing Joseph Cardinal Bernardin's address on euthanasia at the University of Chicago
Hospital they write "[w]e cannot accept a policy that would open the door to euthanasia
by creating categories of patients whose lives can be considered of no value merely
because they are not conscious." Id. at 122.
218. See generally SHELLY KAGAN, THE LIMITS OF MORALITY (1989).
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Communitarian Bioethics

Communitarian bioethics, another popular theory, is centered
on the patient's own values. Therefore, communitarian bioethics is
difficult to apply in the case of an unconscious patient. As ex
plained by Drs. Eziekial and Linda Emanuel, the ideal relationship
for a patient and physician is a deliberative model in which the doc
tor acts as a teacher and a friend to the patient. 219 In contrast to a
paternalistic model, in which the doctor does what he thinks is best,
and an informative model, in which the doctor merely provides in
formation, in the deliberative model the physician helps the patient
identify "the best health related values that can be realized in the
clinical situation."22o In a deliberative model, the patient's own val
ues are open to discussion in a manner that promotes self-under
standing relevant to medical care. 221
Yet, how can an anencephalic infant's physician work in a de
liberative model? The patient is not only unconscious, but has
never been conscious. As with the other theories, the doctor pursu
ing a deliberative model must work with the infant's parents, who
are the infant's representatives. The physician cannot, however,
forget that the infant is his patient, not the parents. It may be ac
ceptable to the physician to abide by the parents' decision to with
draw or withhold life support if the burdens of treatment to the
patient outweigh the potential benefits. Such an agreement would
not necessarily include taking organs from a breathing, though un
conscious patient, regardless of the potential good this act would do
for others.
E.

A Philosopher's Analysis of Anencephalic Organ Donation:
Hans Jonas

In the event that there is time for a full exploration of ethical
issues, the ethics committee would benefit from reading two impor
tant essays by the philosopher Hans Jonas. These essays explore
issues of declaring brain death for the purpose of organ donation.
There are two Jonas essays that are relevant to anencephalic
organ donation: Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting with
Humqn Subjects and Against the Stream: Comments on the Defini

219. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, Four Models of the Physician
Patient Relationship, 267 JAMA 2221, 2222 (1992).
220. Id.
221. See id. at 2222, 2225-26.
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tion and Redefinition of Death. 222 In these two essays, Jonas consid
ered, not anencephalic neonates in particular, but subjects of
human experimentation and brain dead organ donors. These two
subjects raised issues highly relevant to anencephalic organ dona
tion: the pronouncement of death and the exploitation of the
powerless.
Writing Philosophical Reflections at the time of the Harvard
Ad Hoc Committee's report on the recognition of brain death,223
Jonas had no disagreement with the idea that a person whose heart
and lungs were being maintained by machines might still be dead
because of lack of brain activity.224 Jonas objected, however, to de
claring brain death for the purpose of converting the patient into an
organ donor. The doctors in this process want not permission "to
turn off the respirator, but, on the contrary, to keep it on and
thereby maintain the body in a state of what would have been 'life'
by the older definition (but is only a 'simulacrum' of life by the
new)-so as to get at his organs and tissues under the ideal condi
tions of what would previously have been 'vivisection."'225 Jonas
further argued that "[s]ince we do not know the exact border line
between life and death, nothing less than the maximum definition
of death will do-brain death plus heart death plus any other indi
cation that may be pertinent-before final violence is allowed to be
done."226
Addressing the issue a year later in Against the Stream, Jonas
reaffirmed his distrust of the Harvard Committee's motives because
of their bias toward obtaining organs for transplantation. Jonas
supported his position by quoting the author of the committee's re
port, Dr. Henry K. Beecher, who asked '''[clan society afford to
discard the tissues and organs of the hopelessly unconscious patient
when they could be used to restore the otherwise hopelessly ill, but
still salvageable individual?"'227 Jonas replied, this "intrusion into
the theoretical attempt to define death makes the attempt
impure."228
Given Jonas' definitive views on the inability to know where
222. HANS JONAS, PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS: FROM ANCIENT CREED TO TECHNO
LOGICAL MAN 105-40 (1974).
223. Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Defini
tion of Brain Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 JAMA 337 (1968).
224. See JONAS, supra note 222, at 129-30.
225. Id. at 129.
226. Id. at 130 (emphasis omitted).
227. Id. at 133.
228. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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the line is between life and death, he probably would have, had he
considered the issue, opposed both the AMA and the legal propo
sal for harvesting organs from an anencephalic infant. Indeed, an
anencephalic infant is the prototype of Jonas' unconscious, but not
yet dead person. In responding to critics who described brain dead
organ donors as vegetables, Jonas wrote "as if 'vegetable' were not
an instance of life!"229 This echoes a recent comment by a leading
ethicist that an anencephalic neonate is at the same brain level of a
fish and therefore is an appropriate source of organs. 230 Many
would question whether a human baby, regardless of her medical
condition, could be compared with a fish. Jonas would not find the
comparison useful. Instead, he would ask whether we have trouble
distinguishing a dead fish from a live one? If the fish is alive, do we
not understand that by depriving it of oxygen we are killing it? A
baby, even one with no higher brain function, is either alive or
dead.
Some of Jonas' arguments may seem to favor anencephalic or
gan donation over other brain dead organ donors because the
anencephalic has never been a living, feeling person. He writes that
as long as the body "breathes [or] pulses ... [it] must still be consid
ered a residual continuance of the subject that loved and was loved,
and as such is still entitled to some of the sacrosanctity accorded to
such a subject by the laws of God and men."231 Although the
anencephalic never "loved," he "was loved" by his family. Does his
lack of ability to feel emotion automatically make him a potential
organ donor? Yet, Jonas' strong position against capitalizing on an
unconscious being, regardless of the reason for his unconsciousness,
weighs toward his opposing the use of anencephalic infants as organ
donors.
Jonas argues persuasively that the greatest sacrifices should not
be exacted from the most vulnerable. Writing on the use of human
subjects in scientific experiments, Jonas stated "the poorer in
knowledge, motivation, and freedom of decision (and that, alas,
means the more readily available in terms of numbers and possible
manipulation), the more sparingly and indeed reluctantly should
the reservoir be used, and the more compelling must therefore be
come the countervailing justification."232 The shortage of donor
229. Id. at 135.
230. See Chartrand, supra note 7.
231. JONAS, supra note 222, at 139.
232. Id. at 123.
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organs would not, to Jonas, be a "countervailing justification."
Harvesting organs from the unconscious patient is "simply and un
qualifiedly impermissible; progress or not, he must never be used
on the inflexible principle that utter helplessness demands utter
protection."233
Jonas' clear repudiation of using unconscious persons as organ
donors places him outside the mainstream of today's medical prac
tices. Patients without brain activity who are not breathing on their
own are often declared dead for the purposes of organ donation. A
new refinement to this technique developed by the Pittsburgh Med
ical Center calls for withdrawing life-support, waiting two minutes,
and then harvesting organs from the newly dead patient. 234 Jonas
would argue that both techniques unjustifiably interfere with the
dying process and thus risk obtaining organs from living persons.
Jonas' work evidences his awareness of where this practice
could lead. One instance concerns the slippery slope effect of using
brain dead individuals as organ donors. Ironically, he writes of al
ternative uses for the breathing body that would be the corpse:
"[l]et us not forget research. Why shouldn't the most wonderful
surgical and grafting experiments be conducted on the complaisant
subject-nonsubject ... ? What a boon for medical instruction, for
anatomical and physiological demonstration and practicing on so
much better material than the inert cadavers otherwise serving in
the dissection room!"235
Jonas' fears have become reality. In a recent article by a medi
cal student present at the removal of organs from a young boy de
clared brain dead, the author writes that after the organs were
removed "all that was left on the table was a carcass of a boy. My
chief resident provided ... me with one of the best anatomy lessons
[I] had ever had. We saw muscles, nerves, and other structures that
we had never found in our cadavers in anatomy class. "236
Hans Jonas would approve of the AMA's reversal of its deci
sion to use "living" anencephalic neonates as organ donors. His
fears regarding the eventual result of an increasing practice of de
claring terminally ill patients "brain dead" for the purposes of or
gan donation have come true. We have, to a large extent, become
Id. at 126.
See supra note 174 and accompanying text for a discussion of this practice.
JONAS, supra note 222, at 137.
Julie Rothstein, Attending to Transitions: A Medical Student's Encounter with
Transplantation, MAKING THE ROUNDS IN HEALTH, FAITH, & ETIucs, Oct. 23, 1995, at
233.
234.
235.
236.
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complacent with the process, enough so that many are willing to
view a breathing, pulsing newborn infant as an appropriate organ
donor.
VII.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Viewed in light of current legal, public health, medical, social,
and ethical norms, the anencephalic infant is viewed as having a
catastrophic birth defect not compatible with life. Anencephalic in
fants are not suitable candidates for organ donation because they
do not meet current legal or medical standards of brain death.237
Efforts to blur the distinction between life and death, by consider
ing the relative value of an anencephalic infant's quality of life, are
troubling. As the discussion of the slippery slope shows, it is a short
distance between deciding that an anencephalic baby has no life
worth living as compared to a person in a permanent vegetative
state who lacks upper brain function. 238 The danger surrounding
anencephalic infants is that the prospect of donation is especially
attractive because the ending of one life can have the direct result
of preserving another life. Furthermore, the need to find meaning
in the life of anencephalic babies makes organ donation by
anencephalic infants a bitterly difficult problem.
Given the continued shortage of donor hearts,239 the issue of
making more organs available continues to be pressing. Whether
anencephalic infants can be a source of these organs remains a
highly controversial legal, public health, medical, social, and ethical
issue. Society as a whole should determine whether anencephalic
infants are to be used as organ donors. As such, the issue requires
more public understanding of the factors that lead some to see
anencephalic infants as dead. More than a technicality or a legal
obfuscation, the barriers to anencephalic organ donation are based
on what we as a society are willing to call life and death.
Nevertheless, ethics committees and hospital counsel must con
tinue to deny the wishes of parents who want their anencephalic
infants to be organ donors, not based solely on a current interpreta
tion of the law, but because our society believes it is important, as
Capron said in 1987, to "separate the dead from the dying."24o
Given the competing interests inherent in anencephalic organ
237.
238.
239.
240.

See Fost, supra note 12; at 333; see also supra Part IV.E.
See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
See Kinkopf-Zajac, supra note 26, at 521-23.
Capron, supra note 195, at 5.
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donation, what should an ethics committee do? The best resolution
of the issue starts with a clear understanding by the ethics commit
tee itself, and the attending medical personnel, of what constitutes
anencephaly and what surrounds anencephalic organ donation.
The first hurdle is brain stem function. It is too easy to think of
anencephalic infants as being "without" a brain and therefore not
fully human. In fact, society is far from a definition of what being
"fully human" entails and, until such a consensus is reached, we are
left with the law as it now stands. The law in the United States
recognizes only two states of being, alive and dead. 241 Death is de
fined in various ways, but in essence involves the complete absence
of brain function.242 While respiration and heart beat can be sus
tained by machines and drugs, making them less reliable indicators
of life, there is currently no way to support brain activity.
A person who is dead, who has no brain function, may be a
source for organ donation. 243 That person must be declared dead
by competent medical authorities based on the legal definition of
death in the state. Thus, while the biomechanics of life can be sus
tained artificially until the actual moment when the organs are re
moved, the individual is dead at the time that death is declared.
Death does not occur at organ removal.
At least for the time being, the law's answer to anencephalic
organ donation is the correct one as well. Until much more is
known about brain function, it seems unduly careless to extend the
definition of death to include individuals with at least some brain
function as dead. This is true for both the person in a permanent
vegetative state as well as for the anencephalic. Whether the per
son never has, or never again will have, higher brain function does
not speak to his condition at the moment. What is he now? Is he
alive? The root issue with anencephalics and persons in persistent
vegetative states may be that it is a judgment of lack of potential.
This is a slippery slope that we should be very careful of sliding
down as it has no natural hand-holds.
That the distinction between total brain death and near total
brain death seems a fine one is not a reason for rejecting the dis
tinction. The anencephalic organ donation programs that led to a
variety of infants who were far short of anencephalic being pro
posed for organ donation evidences our general uncomfortableness
241. See supra Part V.
242. See supra Part V.
243. See supra Part V.E.
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with this topic. 244 It is important to remember that this decision is
being made under the pressure of a shortage of donor organs. 245
This same pressure likely caused the adoption of our current stan
dards of brain death. If there were no need for organs, there would
be no need to declare brain death. Instead, families could decide to
withhold or withdraw treatment without influence of what is
needed for the greater good. We are prepared to reason backwards
when it comes to finding sources for donor organs because society
sees organ donation as a good thing.
Writing this, I appreciate that nothing will convince parents
like the Ms who have experienced the death of their baby without
any possibility of mitigation through organ donation. To them I
would say, the best resolution for an individual family is not the
best resolution for society as a whole. If anencephalies may be or
gan donors, then why not persons in permanent vegetative states or
persons with subnormal intelligence? Much of the tragedy of the
Ms' decision was the lack of consistent information.246 If there is a
well thought-out, clearly expressed position on anencephalic organ
donation developed before the situation arises then parents of
anencephalies will not be given false hopes or unrealistic expecta
tions. An anencephalic infant's short life may be given meaning
through methods short of organ donation. For instance, after they
die, anencephalic infants can be used for research purposes in order
to increase medical science's knowledge of the condition. Corneas
and heart-valves, which remain useable after death,247 can be
donated without restriction. Solely because a baby will die without
ever having attained consciousness does not mean that the child is
not, nor ever has been alive. Legal standards for organ donation
have been set in the United States, and until there is a consensus
that these standards should be changed, anencephalic infants can
not and should not be used as sources for donor organs.
EPILOGUE: THE

Ms

Speaking with the Ms eight months after the triplets' birth, it is
obvious that they still feel anger and frustration at the events sur
rounding their attempts to donate baby Avery's organs. The Ms
244. See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text (discussing proposals of dona
tion by those with conditions other than anencephaly).
245. See supra Part II for a general discussion of the shortage of donor organs.
246. For a discussion of the Ms' experience, see the Prologue to this Article.
247. See Lafreniere & McGrath, supra note 14, at 445.
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were very. willing to talk about that time, and about their feelings
then and now. Mr. M said talking about Baby Avery made him feel
better. Mrs. M mourns both Baby Avery and her mother. She feels
that Baby Avery is now with her mother and that her mother is
taking care of her baby. Baby Avery is very much a presence in the
Ms' home. They report having pictures of Baby Avery throughout
their house. The Ms plan to tell the two surviving triplets the story
of Baby Avery, including, when the triplets are older, the organ do
nation that never happened. At the one-year anniversary of Baby
Avery's death, the Ms and their children released balloons into the
sky for Baby Avery and for themselves. The children's balloons,
reported Mrs. M, "all veered off to the left. Baby Avery's balloon,"
a big pink one, "went straight up to the sky."

